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Misaligned Incentives in Markets:
Envisioning Finance That Benefits All of Society
Dr. Ryan Clements1

The modern financial system is plagued by misaligned incentives
that allow some firms to extract distributive profits, and direct wealth
transfers in their favor, without producing anything of value, or improving society with enhanced employment or socially useful innovation. Many modern financial products and activities serve no
underlying economic or productive purpose. The system is creating
market intermediaries of astounding size, power, profitability, and economic and regulatory policy influence. Some financial firms expressly profit from heightened interconnection and complexity, while
others benefit directly from increased volatility. Yet we all bear the
costs of this evolved financial system when it unravels due to its interconnectedness with the real economy, and our increased reliance on
markets. This article advocates for a financial system that is definancialized, de-complexified, more transparent, and better orientated to productive ends in a way that benefits all of society, not just
the firms who reap asymmetrical payoffs in a complex system, intermediate capital, create financial products, or run the plumbing in a
system that ultimately serves them best.
This article gives support to Hyman Minsky’s “money manager capitalism” hypothesis by showing how the financial system has evolved
since the 2008 crisis because of misaligned incentives. In support of
this contention the article profiles numerous post-crisis trends and
events in financial markets where misaligned incentives emerge, including moral hazard in debt origination, how some financial firms
benefit from volatility; the real winners of the GameStop “meme
stock” saga; problems from price dislocations in credit exchange
traded funds (ETFs) during the coronavirus pandemic crash; conflicts
in the construction and composition of indices; market disruption
from volatility-linked exchange traded products (ETPs); misaligned
1. Assistant Professor, Chair in Business Law and Regulation at the University of Calgary
Faculty of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Lawrence G. Baxter, Professor James D.
Cox, Professor Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Lee Reiners, the
Duke Global Financial Markets Center, and Professor Bryce Tingle for helpful guidance and
advice. Any inaccuracies are the sole responsibility of the author.
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incentives in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) and
evolved private equity (PE) business models; fragilities in pension administration; environmental, social, governance (ESG) opacity and
greenwashing in investment funds; and governance conflicts from economic and proxy voting power of mega-asset managers.
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INTRODUCTION

Many modern financial products and activities serve no useful underlying economic or productive function at all, other than profit for
their originators and speculation for their users. This article uniquely
advances Hyman Minsky’s “money manager capitalism” (MMC) hypothesis,2 and places it within the robust post-crisis literature on
financialization,3 by showing how the financial system has evolved
since the 2008 crisis because of misaligned incentives. This evolved
financial system is creating market intermediaries of astounding size,
power, profitability, and economic and regulatory policy influence.
Some financial firms expressly profit from greater complexity and interconnection, without producing anything, while others benefit directly from increased volatility. Yet we all bear the costs of this
evolved financial system when it unravels due to its interconnectedness with the real economy, and main street’s increased reliance on
markets.
2. See Hyman P. Minsky, Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist Economies,
30(2) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 357, 362-363 (1996), available at https://digitalcommons.
bard.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=HM_archive; see Hyman Minsky, Money
Manager Capitalism, HYMAN P. MINSKY ARCHIVE, PAPER 13 (1989), 26 http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/13.
3. See infra Sections II(b) & V(c).
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This article advocates for a financial system that is de-financialized,
de-complexified, more transparent, and better orientated to productive ends in a way that benefits all of society, not just the firms who
reap asymmetrical payoffs in a complex system, intermediate capital,
create financial products, or run the plumbing in a system that best
serves them. In support of this contention the article profiles numerous post-crisis misaligned incentives in financial markets including
financialization trends, moral hazard in debt origination, how some
financial firms benefit from volatility; the real winners of the GameStop “meme stock” saga; problems from price dislocations in credit exchange traded funds (ETFs) during the coronavirus pandemic crash;
conflicts in the construction and composition of indices; market disruption from volatility-linked exchange traded products (ETPs); misaligned incentives in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs)
and evolved private equity (PE) business models; fragilities in pension
administration; environmental, social, governance (ESG) opacity and
greenwashing in investment funds; and governance conflicts from economic and proxy voting power of mega-asset managers.
Minsky vigorously argued that economics was not a “subdivision of
mathematics,” and that theories regarding the economy relied on “observations” of what took place in the “actual economy.”4 He observed that “real world outcomes” were heavily dependent on the
behavior of institutions and people, and that the “simplistic propositions of laissez-faire no longer hold.”5 The real world as Minsky saw it
is even now more strikingly true – capitalism in the U.S. has evolved
to a point where “money managers” (which this article will extend to
include a variety of financial market intermediaries and service providers) now wield vast economic power, extract massive profits from
the economy, and exert significant regulatory and government influence.6 Even in the 1980’s, Nobel laureate Professor James Tobin was
skeptical about the efficiency of the financial system.7 While positing
4. See Minsky, Uncertainty, supra note 1 at 358 (“relevant theory is not a compendium of
propositions derived from axioms assumed to be universally true”)
5. Id. at 367.
6. Id. at 358-359.
7. See James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, LLOYDS BANK REVIEW 1
(1984). (Tobin organized his critique of financial markets around four concepts of efficiency (see
at 2-3): “information arbitrage” efficiency with asset prices revealing all known public information; “fundamental valuation” efficiency with prices accurately reflecting underlying fundamental value of assets including the value of all future payments or dividends; “full-insurance”
efficiency with risk being rationally apportioned, known contingencies capable of effective hedging, borrowing aligned effectively to consumption, and the market operating in a state of competitive equilibrium; finally “functional” efficiency with the profits of financial firms being
justified, despite these firms not providing a productive or consumptive service, because of some
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that financial markets might be “information-arbitrage” efficient,8 he
expressed reservations about the fundamental-valuation,9 full-insurance,10 and functional efficiency of financial markets – in other words
the justification of financial firm’s profits because of the valuable “social function” they perform.11 He even went as far as to say “[w]hat is
clear is that very little work done by the securities industry, as gauged
by the volume of market activity, has to do with the financing of real
investment in any very direct way.”12 Tobin’s reservations, particularly regarding functional efficiency, ring especially true today, and as
this article will show, it is even worse than he posited in 1984.13 Market inefficiencies are exacerbated by a fundamentally flawed incentive
structure where the externalities emanating from the profit-seeking
activities of financial intermediaries can be passed on as shared costs
borne by all of society (and the sovereign),14 while the benefits are
captured by only a few.15
The article proceeds as follows. First, Section II describes the post2008 crisis intermediated financial market in the context of an MMC
paradigm, including the continuing impact of financialization, consumer and media market orientation, the role of economic theory in
fostering the passive investing and indexing revolution, the accelerating influence of fintech, and how the asset management landscape has
materially evolved post-crisis.16 Section III profiles numerous cases
valuable social function they otherwise perform such as risk pooling, resource allocation, insurance, payments facilitation, and allocating savings to productive enterprises.)
8. There is evidence, however, particularly in thinly traded markets and nascent asset classes
such as crypto-assets, that markets aren’t “informational-arbitrage” efficient, and that the “law
of one price” is routinely violated. See Alexander Kroeger & Asani Sarkar, Is Bitcoin Really
Frictionless, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics Blog (March 23,
2016), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/is-bitcoin-really-frictionless.html;
Lee Reiners, Bitcoin Futures Are A Bad Idea, DUKE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS FINREG
BLOG (December 13, 2017), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2017/12/13/bitcoin-futuresare-a-bad-idea/.
9. Tobin’s critiques of fundamental valuation efficiency align with prior work done by Professor Robert J. Shiller, see Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by
Subsequent Changes in Dividends? 71 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 421 (1981); Robert J. Shiller, The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure, 87
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1190 (1979).
10. See Tobin, supra note 6 at 5-14. Full insurance efficiency is associated with the well-known
work of Kenneth Arrow & Gerard Debreu, see Kenneth Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of
an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 256 (1954); GERARD DEBREU,
THEORY OF VALUE, AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (1959).
11. See Tobin, supra note 6 at 5-14.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id.
14. Infra Section IV.
15. Infra Section III.
16. Infra Section II.
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studies in misaligned incentives in the financial system leading to private, distributive gains in favor of market intermediaries and away
from ordinary citizens.17 Section IV presents evidence that externalities from this evolved system of misaligned incentives are shared by
all.18 Finally, Section V presents three “fundamental shifts,” together
with resulting policy considerations, that are needed to make markets
more healthy, and beneficial to the interests of productive firms and
society at large: first, decrease the power and influence of market intermediaries; second, increase the transparency and comparability of
investment products; and third, re-assess the calculus of financialization to favor the growth of productive enterprise.19
II.

THE POST-CRISIS INTERMEDIATED MARKET
A. Why Minsky was Right (Again)

Hyman Minsky famously posited that the financial system grew destabilized from within20 – a consequence of the profit seeking enterprises of financial firms.21 He attributed rapid credit growth to the
profit seeking behaviors of financial intermediaries,22 and posthumously increased his public profile after the 2008 crisis revealed that
the profit seeking actions of banks, insurance, and investment companies operating as shadow banks, in pursuit of profits, endogenously
17. Infra Section III.
18. Infra Section IV.
19. Infra Section V.
20. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2008), 4 (“the Wall Streets
of the world are important; they generate destabilizing forces, and from time to time the financial processes of our economy lead to serious threats of financial and economic instability, that
is, the behavior of the economy becomes incoherent.”) See further at 11 194-196, 230-238; see L.
RANDALL WRAY, WHY MINSKY MATTERS (2016), 3, 11, 14-15 (“Minsky argued that the internal
dynamics of our modern economy are not equilibrium seeking. There’s no invisible hand operating that way. Furthermore, if we ever did achieve the mainstream’s beloved ‘equilibrium,’ those
internal dynamics would push us away – the system is not stable. And if by some miracle we
were to get twice lucky – achieving an equilibrium that was stable – stability is destabilizing.”)
21. Minsky described his theory as a “financial instability hypothesis” which envisioned a cycle of endogenously-generated financial instability as banks, and other financial intermediaries,
destabilize the financial system by introducing risky credit and financial products, in a search for
operating profits, during periods of economic repose, see Hyman P. Minsky The Financial Instability Hypothesis, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE WORKING PAPER NO. 74
(May 1992); Minsky, H.P. Financial instability revisited: The economics of disaster. 3 REAPPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT MECHANISM 97 (1972); H.P Minsky, Schumpeter
and finance, in Salvatore Biasco, Alessandro Roncaglia, and Michele Salvati (eds), MARKET AND
INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PAULO SYLOS LABINI
(1993).
22. See Wray, Why Minsky Matters supra note 19 at 38.
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destabilized the financial system.23 Recent empirical studies support
Minsky’s theory of endogenous instability, showing that financial crises originate in a “substantially predictable” way – onset through a
“combination of rapid credit and asset price growth” over a three year
period.24
In addition to his theory of financial instability,25 Minsky believed
that capitalism had an “evolutionary character,” – and that it had survived because “it is a system that is hospitable to institutional
change.”26 Capitalistic institutions (and the larger financial system)
thus evolves from the profit seeking activities of its participants.27
Before he passed, he posited that our system had evolved into a modern “money manager capitalism” (MMC) system.28 The MMC hypothesis posits a precarious system-wide evolution where “money
managers” (which I expand in this article to include other market intermediaries and financial market service providers) increase their
size, economic power, and social and political influence, by virtue of
their profit seeking activities – not the capital needs of productive enterprises.29 In an MMC system the “dominant financial players” are
asset managers in search of returns.30 The MMC complements Minsky’s influential work on endogenous market instability, and scholars
studying Minsky have noted the MMC’s lesser visibility in the
scholarship.31
In an MMC system, asset managers issue financial products, which
act as “proximate owners” of productive enterprises, and perform an
intermediating function between firms and investors.32 MMC fosters
23. See L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE WORKING PAPER NO. 661 (March 2011),
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_661.pdf.
24. See Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer & Jakob Ahm Sorensen, Predictable Financial Crisis, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER 20-130 (2020), https://
www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20-130_6002ac58-19a9-469a-a0cc-506a5f836ae7.pdf.
25. See Wray, Why Minsky Matters supra note 19 at 31-34.
26. Minsky, Money Manager Capitalism, supra note 1 at 26.
27. Id. at 27; see Minsky, Stabilizing, supra note 19 at 7 (“Economic systems are not natural
systems. An economy is a social organization created either through legislation or by an evolutionary process of invention and innovation. Policy can change both the details and the overall
character of the economy, and the shaping of economic policy involves both a definition of goals
and an awareness that actual economic processes depend on economic and social institutions.”)
28. See ERIC TYMOIGNE & L. RANDALL WRAY, THE RISE AND FALL OF MONEY MANAGER
CAPITALISM: MINSKY’S HALF-CENTURY FROM WORLD WAR TWO TO THE GREAT RECESSION,
ROUTLEDGE CRITICAL STUDIES IN FINANCE AND STABILITY (2014), 72-105.
29. See Minsky, Schumpeter, supra note 20; Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 27 at 72-105.
30. See Wray supra note 19 at 38.
31. See Id.; C.J. Whalen, (2002), Money manager capitalism: Still here, but not quite as expected, 36(2) J. OF ECON. ISSUES (2002).
32. Hyman P. Minsky, Uncertainty, supra note 1 at 358.
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the growth of debt,33 and captures mutual and pension funds, and PE
firms who traditionally, “provided the equity investment for highly
leveraged buy outs of firms,”34 but, as will be discussed in depth below,35 have now evolved their operations to originate credit and perform other “shadow banking” activities.36 MMC emerged through the
evolution of American capitalism in five stages: commercial;37 industrial (including “wild cat” financing); financial (including “state financing”); paternalistic (including “welfare state” and managerial
financing); and finally MMC.38
Minsky noted that MMC had six characteristics: (1) businesses
often organize in a corporate form; (2) financial institutions (including
banks, insurance companies, and asset managers) hold the liabilities of
these corporations as assets; (3) a “new layer of intermediation” is
inserted between the corporation and the financial institutions (as well
as other savers and investors) by asset (fund) managers; (4) certain
contractual obligations form around these asset managers; (5) the
“stated aim” of the asset managers is to maximize the value of these
intermediated investment products; and (6) the performance of a
given fund is measured by a “total return on assets” which includes
dividends and interest received and share price appreciation.39
Professors Eric Tymoigne and L. Randall Wray have suggested that
MMC also includes the phenomena of “securitization, globalization,
financialization, deregulation and desupervision.”40
This article’s central claim is that Minsky’s MMC hypothesis remains critically relevant today, and it has evolved in complex ways not
captured by the six characteristics above. It manifests beyond the conventional search for yield in investment returns by asset managers,
and is now seen in misaligned incentives in the financial market which
lead to a diverse range of private gains for financial firms41 and shared
33. See Wray, supra note 19 at 148 (“[t]his was the ugly side of money manager capitalism: the
growth of financial assets under management was equal to the growth of financial liabilities of
somebody.”)
34. Minsky, Uncertainty, supra note 1 at 358.
35. See infra Sections II(f), III(b) & IV(c).
36. The Federal Reserve has defined shadow banking as “financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees.” See Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft &
Haley Boesky, Shadow Banking, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT 458,
458 (2010); see Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 27 at 44-45
37. See Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 27 at 44-45.
38. See Minsky, Uncertainty, supra note 1 at 362 (1996).
39. Id. at 363.
40. Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 27 at 72.
41. See infra Section III.
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costs for all of society.42 It has proven resilient post-2008 crisis, and is
now fostering unprecedented concentrations of economic power and
public policy influence for the largest asset managers,43 while creating
new market externalities (shared costs) which emerge from the deepened complexity and interconnectedness of the financial system.44 After the 2008 crisis, universal banks were subjected to heightened
regulatory standards, paving the way for asset managers to increase
their importance as shadow banks and financial intermediaries – a period Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane has described as “the age of asset management.”45 This article positions
Minsky’s vision of an evolved capitalistic structure dominated by financial intermediaries within the age characterized by Haldane, and
supplemented by the theories of Karl Polanyi that financial markets
evolve to render society as “an accessory to the economic system.”46
B. The Continuing Impact of Financialization
Over the past four decades the relative size of the financial industry
has grown as a function of the economy, and trillions of dollars of
profits have been transferred to the financial sector away from other
productive industries.47 Concurrently, the pay disparities between financial and non-financial executives have widened.48 During this
time, markets have significantly deepened in complexity and interconnectedness, while the number of participants and intermediaries interfacing with each other through an ever increasing number of
financial products, trading venues and applications have exponentially
expanded.49
42. See infra Section IV.
43. See infra Sections IV(h) & V(a).
44. See infra Section IV.
45. Andrew Haldane, The age of asset management? Bank of England (April 4, 2014), https://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2014/the-age-of-asset-management.
46. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION, 75 (1st ed. 1957).
47. See D. Tomaskovic-Devey & K-H Lin, Income dynamics, economic rents, and the
financialization of the U.S. Economy. 76 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 538 (2011).
48. See S.N. Kaplan & J. Rauh, Wall Street and main street: What contributes to the rise in the
highest incomes? 23 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1004 (2010); John Bakija, Adam Cole &
Badley Heim, Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income
Inequality: Evidence From U.S. Tax Return Data, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (April 2012).
49. See Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV.
779 (2011); Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected to Fail?
22(4) U. PA. J. BUS. L. 772 (2020); See Ryan Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds, (forthcoming) VIRGINIA.
LAW & BUS. REV. 63 (2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680219
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Markets today have given rise to “meta-markets,” and as a result,
system-wide complexity (and risk) has been extended by lengthened
chains of financial intermediation and increased informational opacity.50 As information “signal” become harder to ascertain,51 and the
costs of obtaining valuable information increases,52 actors are disincentivized to engage in price discovery and “informational deficits”
can easily lead to investor herds and irrational market behavior.53
This article will identify many such incidents,54 all of which are generated by a misaligned incentive structure.
C. Increased Consumer and Media Financial Market Orientation
Today, finance is woven tightly into the daily fabric of society –
some argue too much so.55 Households are orientated to the markets
due to self-directed investments and greater levels of consumer and
real-estate debt.56 This orientation at the household level is, in large
part, due to employers moving away from offering “defined benefit
plans” (which guarantee a specific retirement income) towards “defined contribution” plans, owned and managed by employees, which
increased consumer orientation towards the market and crystalized
the importance of financial products.57
Markets have largely been “democratized” with the emergence of
online discount brokers and fintech innovations like “robo-advisors”
offering low-fee access to intra-day securities trading, ETFs and other
50. See Manuel Utset, Rational Financial Meltdowns, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 407, 407-408,
(2014).
51. Signal, which is pertinent information relating to the value of an asset can be contrasted
with “noise” which is generated from “uninformed” trading, but which can still have a material
impact on the price of an asset, see Bing Han, Ya Tang, & Liyan Yang, Public Information and
Uninformed Trading: Implications for Market Liquidity and Price Efficiency, 163 J. OF ECON.
THEORY 604, 605 (2016).
52. See Utset, Rational, supra note 49 at 424.
53. Id. at 428.
54. See infra Section IV.
55. See Steve Denning, Why Financialization Has Run Amok, FORBES (June 3, 2014), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/06/03/why-financialization-has-run-amok/
?sh=71b394f33d7d; Christine Emba, Has our economy become too ‘financialized’? THE WASHINGTON POST (April 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/18/
has-our-economy-become-too-financialized/.
56. Gerald F. Davis & Suntae Kim, Financialization of the Economy, 41 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
SOCIOLOGY 203, 203-204, 216 (2015).
57. See J.S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing The Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
243, 243-260 (2004); see Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 11, 11-21
(2008).
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ETPs.58 Dreams of riches through “day trading” have captured the
imaginations of many (as witnessed recently in a spike in day trading
during the coronavirus pandemic), often to the detriment of novice
investors.59 The more individuals interface with, and are oriented
daily towards, the financial market, the more economically powerful
and profitable the intermediated asset management industry grows.60
Further, the more deeply cemented the evolved system of MMC
becomes.
D. Economic Theory and the Passive Investment Revolution
With the outsourcing of pensions and retirement savings to Wall
Street, and the increased orientation of main street and consumers to
the financial markets, a counter-intuitive phenomenon has also
emerged - what is rational for the individual may, in fact, end up being
sub-optimal for society at large. Since the 2008 crisis there has been
an incredible transition towards index and passive investing.61 Modern portfolio theory suggests that a low-cost, diversified, investment
portfolio is an efficient individual strategy for a wide segment of society since it mitigates the “idiosyncratic risk” of individual company
58. See Ryan Clements, Regulating Fintech in Canada and the United States: Comparison,
Challenges and Opportunities, 12(23) UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
SPP RESEARCH PAPERS (August 2019), 21-22, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/
2019/08/Fintech-Clements-final.pdf.
59. See Annie Nova, Many are chasing the stock market by day trading in the pandemic. It
could end badly, CNBC (September 21, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/21/many-peopleturn-to-day-trading-in-pandemic-few-will-be-a-winners.html; see Jessica Camille Aguirre, “It’s A
Whole Other Level of Insanity:” How Pandemic Day Traders Are Turning Wall Street Upside
Down, VANITY FAIR (September 14, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/how-pandemic-day-traders-are-turning-wall-street-upside-down.
60. There is evidence that this economic power is disproportionally converging around three
firms, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721,
723 (2019) (“Over the last decade, more than 80% of all assets flowing into investment funds has
gone to the Big Three, and the proportion of total funds flowing to the Big Three has been rising
through the second half of the decade.”). Bebchuk and Hirst cite a variety of reasons for this
phenomenon including operational economies of scale and the ability to provide preferential
treatment to institutional clients (see at 729). However the impact of the media on a financeoriented culture may also be a major contributing factor. Because of a behavioral economics
phenomenon known as “overreliance on salience” there may be a quality perception bias for
certain firms based on their higher profile, and more frequent media mention. See Clements,
Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 41; see ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, Behavioral Insights Key Concepts, Applications and Regulatory Considerations, OSC STAFF NOTICE
11-778 (March 29, 2017), 33 https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category1/
sn_20170329_11-778_behavioural-insights.pdf.
61. See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became The Market, BLOOMBERG (September 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-market/?srnd=etfs; see
FINANCIAL TIMES, Opinion Lex, BlackRock / Vanguard: ETF Leviathans (January 18, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/983542f1-151d-4fae-947a-6509967183aa.
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stocks.62 Empirical evidence suggests that investors are better off
buying the entire market than attempting to beat it by picking individual stocks.63 This explains the massive migration between 2006 and
2018 of more than $3 billion in investment assets away from actively
managed funds to passive index funds in the U.S.64
Just prior to his passing, Vanguard’s late founder John Bogle suggested that a “tragedy of the commons” had emerged in the markets
due to the nascent dominance of passive investments and indexing,
and the rise of “momentum” and other trend strategies, in the form of
impaired price discovery, herding and heighted market volatility.65
This article seeks to deepen the tragedy of the commons analogy by
arguing that our evolved system of MMC is not solely a byproduct of
the individually rational investment decisions of investors,66 but also
the individually rational profit seeking motivations of financial firms
driven by misaligned incentives.67 Thus the externalities of MMC are
also a by-product of rational individual choices (by both retail and
institutional investors). The MMC, however, in its post-crisis variety
has much larger implications. It is fundamentally changing the organizational structure of capitalism, the role of sovereign, and the social
62. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 77 (1952)
63. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of
Mutual Fund Returns, 65(5) J. OF FINANCE 1915 (2010); Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The
implications of passive investing for securities markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, at 116-17
(Mar. 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803j.pdf; J. Busse, A. Goyal & S. Wahal, Investing in a global world, 18(2) REVIEW OF FINANCE 561 (2014).
64. See Sushko, & Turner, supra note 62 at 113–131; R. Henderson, JPMorgan edges closer to
zero fees in a push for passive. FINANCIAL TIMES (March 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
4e971cba-4414-11e9-a965-23d669740bfb; J. Gittelsohn, End of Era: Passive Equity Funds Surpass Active in Epic Shift, BLOOMBERG (September 11, 2019) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-09-11/passiveu-s-equity-funds-eclipse-active-in-epic-industry-shift; Paul Samuelson,
Challenge to Judgement, 1 JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 17 (1974); Judith Evans &
Jonathan Eley, Democratizing Finance: How Passive Funds Changed Investing, Financial Times
(Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/b3c0c960-a56c-11e4-bf11-00144feab7de; Ben Johnson, Active vs. Passively Managed Funds: Takeaways From Our Midyear Report, MORNINGSTAR
BIG PICTURE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2018/08/23/activelymanaged.html.
65. John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds A Warning on Index Funds, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
(November 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds1543504551?mod=trending_now_4.
66. See Conrad de Aenlle, Opinion: John Bogle has a Warning for Index Fund Investors,
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/john-bogle-has-a-warningfor-index-fund-investors-2017-06-01 (“As with any tragedy of the commons, indexing is the sensible thing for each individual to do, but each individual should remember that many sensible
ideas, especially in investing, make less sense as more people put them into practice. When the
stock market turns down again, index fund owners will have to become their own active manager
and make sure they’re well diversified, with limited exposure to risk, chaos, and catastrophe.”)
67. See infra Section III.
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function of market intermediaries, and in so doing generating shared
externalities.68
E. Fintech Acceleration and Global Interconnection
The process of market intermediation has been dramatically altered
by fintech, which has both “democratized” access to financial markets
by lowing the cost of, and barriers to, participation for average lowaccount size investors, and allowed for a wide range of diversified financial products such as index funds and ETFs at extremely low
costs.69 Fintech intermediation innovations, like the California-based
Acorns, are providing financial inclusionary benefits by allowing investors to “round-up” their consumer purchases and “invest their
spare change” through micro-buys of ETFs, thereby facilitating an automated savings mechanism for low dollar accounts.70 These fintechenabled investment mechanisms have grown alongside increased popularity in algorithmic wealth management programs (“robo-advisors”), which build low-cost model portfolios often using ETFs.71
At the forefront of this digital intermediation revolution are online
discount brokerages like Robinhood,72 which describes itself as one of
the first technology platforms to offer a “commission-free trading environment.”73 Robinhood has had a tremendous impact on the investment industry;74 yet, as this article will profile in detail, in light of the
68. See infra Section IV.
69. See Evans & Eley, supra note 63.
70. See Kate Rooney, Fintech start-up Acorns valued at $860 million after latest funding round,
CNBC (28 January 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/28/fintech-start-up-acorns-valued-at860-million-after-latest-funding-round.html
71. See Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 788 (2019); Bret E. Strzelczyk, Rise of the Machines: The Legal Implications For Investor Protection With The Rise of Robo-Advisors, 16 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 55
(2017). Some fear that Robo-advisors increase the potential for correlated investment portfolios
and “herding risk”, see William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VANDERBILT LAW. REV. 1167,
1199, 1209 (2018); Francesco D’Acunto, Prabhala Nagpurnan & Alberto Rossi, The Promises
and Pitfalls of Robo-Advising, CESIFO WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 6907 (2018), available from
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165339. Also, there are concerns in the literature on liability and the
fiduciary implications of algorithmic wealth management, see John Lightborne, Algorithms and
Fiduciaries: Existing and Proposed Regulatory Approach to Artificially Intelligent Financial Planners, 67 DUKE L. J. 651 (2017). These fintech platforms also give rise to new regulatory challenges and risks like ensuring product suitability, managing cyber-security, data privacy, and the
systemic implications of scalability, see Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice
Across The Finance Service Industry, 103 IOWA LAW REV. 713 (2018).
72. See ROBINHOOD, https://robinhood.com/ (last accessed February 3, 2021)
73. Id.
74. John Divine, How Robinhood Changed an Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct.
17, 2019), https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/how-robinhood-changed-anindustry
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recent GameStop short squeeze and meme stock saga, it is not certain
that the firm’s contribution to market efficiency, or stability, is net
positive.75 Rather, firms like Robinhood, and their resultant impact
on the integrity of markets, may strengthen Professor Saule
Omarova’s warnings of fintech-driven systemic risks through an increased “synthesizing” of economic interests, and the “scaling-up” of
trading transaction volume and speed.76 As a contribution to this line
of scholarship, this article will focus on the question of misaligned incentives, and how Robinhood, and other market intermediaries benefit from increased volatility,77 while society shares the costs.78
F. The Evolved Post-Crisis Asset Management Landscape
The asset management landscape has evolved to include a diverse
and complex array of intermediation including conventional asset
managers with retail accessible investment products, like mutual funds
and ETFs which product class is dominated by the “giant three” U.S.
firms BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Capital.79 Exchange
traded funds are likely the most successful post-2008 crisis financial
product,80 with sector growth aided by regulatory accommodations.81
The largest investment fund managers control a breathtaking, and unprecedented amount of capital, with recent reports noting the aforementioned “giant three” respectively controlling, through
intermediated holdings, over $19 trillion in assets – or nearly 10% of
the global financial market.82
75. See infra Sections III(i) & Section IV(e).
76. See Omarova, supra note 70 at 741, 762-765.
77. See infra Sections III(i).
78. See infra Section IV.
79. See. Bebchuck & Hirst, supra note 59 at 723; J. Fichtner, E.M. Heemskerk, & J. GarciaBernardo (2017). Hidden power of the big three? Passive index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new financial risk, 19(2) BUSINESS AND POLITICS 298 (2017).
80. Consulting firm ETFGI Global has recently reported that from 2008 to 2019 the number
of ETFs worldwide grew from 1617 to 6940, and during this time period the the value of assets
held in ETF products also increased from $716 billion to over $6 trillion. See ETGFI, ETFGI
report assets in the global ETFs and ETPs industry which will turn 30 years old in March started
the new decade with a record 6.35 trillion US dollars (January 16, 2020), https://etfgi.com/news/
press-releases/2020/01/etfgi-reports-assets-global-etfs-and-etps-industry-which-will-turn-30; see
Clements, Are ETFs, supra note 48; Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange
Traded Funds Make Markets Less Stable? Part I, Liquidity Illusions, 20 HOU. BUS. & TAX L. J.
15 (2020); Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Are Exchange Traded Funds Making
Markets Less Stable? Part II Interaction Risks, 21(1) HOU. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1 (2020).
81. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Exchange Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release
No. 33,646 (September 25, 2019), 84 Fed. Reg. 57,162, 57,166 (Oct. 24, 2019) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 232, 239, 270, 274), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/33-10695.pdf.
82. See FINANCIAL TIMES, supra note 60.
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Precise estimates of the total size of the global asset management
industry are difficult because of the diversity of firms and complexity
of their operations, including traditional equity and fixed income asset
and investment product managers, PE, venture capital (VC), alternative investment management (including a diverse range of hedge or
other fund structures). In 2020, researchers from the Boston Consulting Group estimated that in 2019 there were $89 trillion global assets
under management (AUM).83 AUM is not the sole indicator of the
size, or influence, of market intermediaries whose diverse operations
include private and public advisory work, and increasingly financial
infrastructure services, highlighted by BlackRock’s powerful Aladdin
risk analysis and end-to-end investment management platform, which
influences the management of around $20 trillion of assets
worldwide.84
There is also a complex network of for-profit market intermediaries
who run the plumbing, and continual functioning, of the financial system, including high frequency trading (HFT) market makers like Citadel, who dominates a material share of the market making and trade
execution business in U.S. equity and options markets,85 and Jane
Street, one of the key participants in the arbitrage ecosystem powering
the effective operation of an ETF.86 One would think that market
making firms like Citadel and Jane Street sidestep incentive misalignment problems given their market efficiency utility; however, this proposition isn’t certain. In fact, given the nascent popularity of
commission free trading applications like Robinhood, which Citadel
pays for order flow,87 their profit making incentives may be contributing to increased market volatility and distributive gains for Wall Street
83. See Lubasha Heredia, Simon Bartletta, Joe Carrubba, Dean Frankle, Katsuyoshi Kurihara,
Benoı̂t Macé, Edoardo Palmisani, Neil Pardasani, Thomas Schulte, Ben Sheridan & Qin Xu,
Global Asset Management 2020: Protect, Adapt and Innovate, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP
(May 19, 2020), https://www.bcg.com/en-ca/publications/2020/global-asset-management-protectadapt-innovate.
84. BlackRock’s Aladdin risk management system – also called a “digital financial platform”
has recently been described as “one of the most consequential and unexamined developments in
global finance,” see Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, William A Birdthistle, Douglas W Arner, & Ross P.
Buckley, Digital Finance Platforms: Toward a New Regulatory Paradigm, 23:1 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
1, 2 (2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3532975.
85. See Tom Maloney & Sally Bakewall, Citadel Securities Doubled Profit as Dominance Grew
in 2020, BLOOMBERG (September 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0925/citadel-doubled-profit-increased-dominance-in-wild-2020-trading.
86. See Robin Wigglesworth, Jane Street: the top Wall Street firm ‘no one’s heard of,’ FINANTIMES (January 27, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/81811f27-4a8f-4941-99b3-2762
cae76542?shareType=nongift.
CIAL

87. Id.
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at the expense of main street investors.88 Further, for-profit liquidity
provision is historically fragile in a crisis due to risk that key participants in the financial ecosystem will disappear when their services are
most needed (and when costs are most likely to be shared by all of
society).89
In addition to ETF and mutual fund managers like BlackRock and
Vanguard, PE firms have ballooned in size, profitability and economic
influence since the 2008 crisis, while conventional investment banks,
operating under the gambit of enhanced post-crisis regulation, have
declined in market dominance.90 Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) – a
strategy where heavy debt is used to acquire private companies, which
are then restructured and sold - were historically the “heart” of a PE
firms’ business.91 There is significant variance in the form that an
LBO can take, some driven by management, others by outsiders.92
LBOs were heralded in the 1980’s, based on the highly influential
work of Professor Michael C. Jensen, as the remedy for conflicts and
agency costs between corporate managers and shareholders in public
corporations on issues such as firm size and use of cash flow.93 The
use of leverage to take a company private was also regarded as increasing shareholder value by unifying shareholder and managerial
interests.94
Professor Tuch’s work suggests a “transformation of the financial
services industry” with PE deeply integrated in (and benefiting from)
the evolution of Wall Street.95 PE firm’s fingerprints can now be
found on nearly every segment of the economy, and these firms have
thrived post-crisis under lower regulatory parameters than large
banks, while investors seek yield in a low interest rate environment.96
The operations of PE firms have widely expanded beyond LBOs to
88. See infra Section III(i)
89. See infra Sections III(a), IV(a), IV(b) & (IV)(g).
90. See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315 (2018).
91. See Everything is Private Equity Now, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (October 3, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-12-29/shows-and-movies-to-binge-this-pandemic-winter.
92. See S. Kaplan & P. Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23(1) JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 121 (2009); S. Thompson & M. Wright, Corporate Governance: The
Role of Restructuring Transactions, 105(430) ECONOMIC JOURNAL 690 (1995).
93. See Michael Jensen, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, 76(2)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 323 (1986);
94. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency
costs, and ownership structure, 3(4) JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 305 (1976); Michael C.
Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW MAGAZINE (September
-October 1989), https://hbr.org/1989/09/eclipse-of-the-public-corporation.
95. Tuch, supra note 89 at 338-350.
96. Everything is Private Equity Now, supra note 90.
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activities conventionally performed by investment banks including
M&A advice, securities underwriting, brokerage activities, proprietary
trading, and the formation of diverse families of funds including
hedge, traditional PE, VC, property, credit and infrastructure.97 Even
the educational sector is now at play in the PE handbook, where private college takeovers have been shown to increase tuition and per
student debt levels, while lowing graduation rates, loan repayment
rates and earning per graduates.98 PE’s post-crisis imprint is also notable in the residential real estate sector, where the needs of institutional investors and tenants are widely disparate, highlighted by a
2016 study in Georgia which revealed a 66 percent increased likelihood of eviction notices for institutionally controlled properties.99
PE firms have seized the coronavirus pandemic as an opportunity to
grow their loan origination business.100 Apollo Global Management,
Inc. (Apollo), alongside PE mega firms KKR and BlackStone, have
steadily maneuvered away from traditional leveraged buy-outs to loan
underwriting since the 2008 financial crisis, while growing their primary credit divisions – once an exclusive function of “traditional financial institutions.”101 Since PE firms are not banks (and thus
operate under lower regulatory parameters) they use investor funds,
and other innovate measures like life insurance or annuity premiums,
to fund the loans they offer.102 Relatedly, Apollo and Blackstone.,
two of the largest PE firms, both recently entered the student loan
business by purchasing the loan portfolio of Wells Fargo.103 Even
BlackRock has increased its PE footprint since the crisis, although

97. Tuch, supra note 89 at 342-350.
98. See Charlie Eaton, Sabrina Howell & Constantine Yannelis, When Investor Incentives and
Consumer Interests Diverge: Private Equity in Higher Education, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 24976 (April 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24976.
99. See Prashant Gopal, Wall Street, America’s New Landlord, Kicks Tenants to the Curb,
BLOOMBERG (January 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-03/wall-streetamerica-s-new-landlord-kicks-tenants-to-the-curb.
100. See Mark Vandevelde & Sujeet Indap, Apollo: how a private equity giant is navigating the
crisis, FINANCIAL TIMES (April 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6fce9808-84ab-11ea-b55537a289098206
101. Id. (“Emulated by peers including Blackstone and KKR, Apollo’s $200bn credit portfolio
is among the slickest operators in America’s “shadow banking” industry, churning out everything from residential mortgages to aircraft leases and commercial real estate loans.”)
102. Id.
103. See Hannah Levitt, Wells Fargo to Sell Student Loan Book to Apollo, BlackStone,
BLOOMBERG (December 18, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-19/wellsfargo-to-sell-student-loan-book-to-apollo-blackstone.
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wresting market share may prove to be an uphill battle against sector
incumbents.104
III.

HOW MISALIGNED INCENTIVES CREATE PRIVATE GAINS
A. Moral Hazard and Discretionary Liquidity

Market intermediaries, like fixed income asset managers, can secure
private gains while increasing the potential for moral hazard in corporate debt origination, since significant demand for fund-level liquidity
transformation (turning thinly traded loans and over-the-counter
bonds into instantly liquid exchange traded credit funds) can lower
incentives to perform underwriting due diligence.105 This moral hazard potential, reminiscent of the “originate to distribute” drivers
which exacerbated “poor quality” mortgage loans in the 2008 crisis,106
becomes even more significant considering the government’s recent
aggressive intervention in credit markets during the coronavirus initial
selloff in March 2020.107 Credit ETFs have intrinsic, product-level, fragilities since they rely on profit seeking market intermediaries to provide discretionary liquidity for price and operational stability.108 The
reliance on independent financial firms, who are motivated purely by
market incentives, makes credit ETFs similar to prior financial products like auction rate securities (ARS),109 and portfolio insurance,110
104. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock Scales Back Private-Equity Fund Ambitions, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (January 1, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-scales-back-privateequity-fund-ambitions-11609497001?st=irm5h5zh6q4kwyp&reflink=article_email_share (identifying BlackRock’s challenges raising money using an unconventional PE fund structure, without
a proven track-record, that indefinitely locked-up investor money).
105. See Marco Pagano, Antonio Sanchez Serrano & Josef Zechner, Can ETFs Contribute To
Systemic Risk? REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE NO.9, EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC
RISK BOARD (June 2019), 3-4, 28-29, https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/
esrb.asc190617_9_canetfscontributesystemicrisk~983ea11870.en.pdf.
106. See Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FDIC CENTER FOR FINANCIAL RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 2010-08 (August
2010), https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/2010/wp2010/2010-08.pdf.
107. See, SECONDARY MARKET CORPORATE CREDIT FACILITY, FEDERAL RESERVE, POLICY
TOOLS, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm (last visited June 28, 2020);
Andrea Riquier, The Fed is Going to Buy ETFs. What Does It Mean? MARKETWATCH (May 12,
2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fed-is-going-to-buy-etfs-what-does-it-mean-202003-23.
108. See Clements, New Funds I, supra note 79 at 24-28.
109. See id. at 55 (“The ETF market echoes some of the follies of the ARS failure. First, there
was a perception that ARS would be liquid, which later proved illusory when the intermediaries
who were relied on to support the auction withdrew from the process. [*]. . .[*]. . .[*] This is
similar to some of the expressed fears with ETFs—that the APs and other market makers, particularly those run by computer algorithms, will stop providing liquidity support to retail investors in the secondary market, thus backing out of the ETF market and redemption process when
it is in their best economic interest to do so.”)
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which were also reliant on the discretionary actions of profit-seeking
intermediaries for stability, which proved to be a fundamental element in their respective failure.111
Fragilities in the operational ecosystem of credit ETFs were revealed during the initial coronavirus market sell-off in March 2020.112
Authorized participants (APs) - key intermediaries in the ETF operational ecosystem - stepped back from performing a vital stabilizing
function in the operation of a credit ETF.113 Bond dealers in the underlying markets stepped back from taking on balance sheet risk.114
This resembled the way that intermediaries stepped back from supporting the ARS market in the 2008 crisis.115 As a result, there was
historic unprecedented dislocation in the trading price of credit ETFs
relative to their net asset values (NAV).116 Credit ETF price dislocations create the potential for interconnection and contagion risk if
these products are used as near cash substitutes, or low duration secure investments (like money market mutual funds (MMMFs)) in the
110. See Id.at 51-52 (“Those fearing ETF liquidity death spirals see an analogous application;
a financial instrument that is designed to provide liquidity could in fact amplify a run on liquidity
and create a pro-cyclical sell-off for both the ETF and the underlying assets, which could cascade
to other asset classes as well. Another parallel between ETFs and portfolio insurance that has
proven to be a fallacy is the generally accepted belief that if futures selling drives too steep,
discount arbitrageurs would step in and purchase the clearly undervalued stocks. [*]. . .[*]. . .[*]
in 1987, there was an uncertainty about what the true value was and market participants were
not active when they are were needed.”)
111. See id. at 48-51.
112. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 10.
113. See Ryan Clements, What Have We Learned So Far About ETFs In The COVID-19 Crisis, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS CENTER FINREG BLOG
(April 3, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/04/03/what-have-we-learned-so-farabout-etfs-in-the-covid-19-crisis/#comment-668.
114. See Sirio Aramonte & Fernando Avalos, The recent distress in corporate bond markets:
cues from ETFs, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BULLETIN NO. 6 (April 14, 2020), 14, available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull06.pdf;
115. See Clements, New Funds I, supra note 79 at 51.
116. See Gillian Tett, ETFs are the canary in the bond coal mine, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 29,
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6bdc7747-3ab9-4410-a4b2-ba9acbe204e8; Lewis Braham,
Emerging Market ETF Pricing Another Victim of the Coronavirus Outbreak, BARRON’S (March
26, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/emerging-market-etf-pricing-another-victim-of-thecoronavirus-outbreak-51585217700; Andrea Riquier, ETFs behaving badly: ‘exactly what they are
supposed to do’ or ‘just what we feared’? MARKETWATCH (March 28, 2020), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-to-think-about-the-turbulence-in-etf-pricing-and-hereswhat-to-do-about-it-2020-03-27; See Dawn Lim, Bond ETFs Flash Warning Signs of Growing
Mismatch, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 23, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bondetfs-flash-warning-signs-of-growing-mismatch-11584964801; See Brian Chappatta, Bond ETFs
Will Never Be The Same After Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG OPINION (March 23, 2020), https://
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-23/coronavirus-bond-etfs-will-never-be-the-sameafter-this-crisis.
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liquidity operation of other institutional investors.117 For example,
mutual funds may hold credit ETFs as cash or near cash substitutes,
and if they receive redemption requests on their funds they may have
to liquidate other assets if the near cash substitutes have fallen in
value.118 This contagion risk resembles the contagion risk experienced in the 2008 crisis when the Reserve Primary Fund (the oldest
MMMF in the U.S.) “broke the buck” due to exposure to toxic Lehman Brothers commercial paper - facilitating a run on the MMMF
market by investors who feared they held a cash substitute that wasn’t
redeemable at its par value.119 Prior to March 2020, there was emerging evidence that low duration credit ETFs were also being used as
MMMF “substitutes.”120
Were it not for the Fed’s intervention into the credit markets in
March 2020,121 including the unprecedented act of buying bonds and
credit ETFs through its Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility
(SMCCF),122 some of these contagion fears could have materialized.123 Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve’s intervention created a direct financial benefit for several ETF issuers since large capital inflows
into bond ETFs took place after the SMCCF was announced – in fact,
much larger than the actual amount of Fed-purchased ETFs.124 By
September 2020, new bond ETF purchases totaled over $150.1 billion
($133 billion of U.S. funds) despite total Federal Reserve ETF
117. See Pagano, Serrano & Zechner, supra note 104 at 3-4, 28-29; Katherine Greifeld, CashLike ETFs See $3 Billion Exit After Fed Steps Into Market, BLOOMBERG (March 30, 2020), https:/
/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-30/fading-funding-squeeze-spurs-3-billion-exitfrom-cash-like-etfs; Stephen Gandel, The Market Time Bomb That’s Bigger Than The Vix,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (February 7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201802-07/there-s-a-time-bomb-bigger-than-the-vix-in-the-market.
118. Katherine Greifeld, Fed Lifeline Saves Bond Funds Teetering on Brink of ETF Hell,
BLOOMBERG (March 28, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-28/fed-lifeline-shields-bond-funds-teetering-on-brink-of-etf-hell.
119. Phillip Swagel, Legal, Political, and Institutional Constraints on the Financial Crisis Policy
Response, 29(2) J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 107, 112-13 (2015); See also Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (Spring 2009), 4041; HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 233-34 (New York: Business Plus, 2010).
120. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 63 (“After the Fed announced support for money market mutual funds (MMMFs) and commercial paper, investor
flows from cash-like ETFs (being held as MMMF equivalents) were also reported.”)
121. See Katherine Greifeld & Luke Kawa, Fed’s Historic Step Into Credit Market May Cure
ETF Dislocations, BLOOMBERG (March 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-03-23/fed-credit-backstop-fuels-surge-in-investment-grade-bond-etfs; see Aramonte &
Avalos, supra note 113 at 4.
122. See FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 106.
123. See Greifeld, supra note 117.
124. The Federal Reserve’s intervention into credit secondary markets has led to its characterization of being a “buyer of first and last resort”, see Riquier, supra note 106.
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purchases of $8.7 billion, including a wide number of “high yield”
(also colloquially known as “junk”) bond funds.125 BlackRock experienced a particular windfall from the Fed’s first ever intervention in
corporate credit markets (including ETFs), in addition to the fact that
the Fed handed over the reins of managing the crisis directly to the
world’s largest asset manager.126 The Fed’s aggressive intervention
undoubtedly calmed markets and eased investor concerns, yet heightened investor confidence manifested in massive funding inflows to
BlackRock ETFs which were already some of the largest of their kind
in the market.127 Thus BlackRock emerged as a financial, and literal
profit, benefactor of government intervention due to a product with
inherent fragilities that it put into the marketplace.
B. Incentive Misalignment in the Private Equity Playbook
PE firms have wide operational freedom in perhaps the most
opaque, profitable (and under-regulated) segment of the asset management industry - an observation that has led to recent criticism and
calls for reform.128 The PE industry has also come under fire recently
for its use of “continuation funds” (also known as “sidecar deals”) as
liquidity vehicles in the coronavirus pandemic, when merger and going public transactions have waned.129 These innovations use new in125. See Riquier, supra note 106. The Federal Reserve bond ETF purchases during the
coronavirus pandemic has been in a variety of fund types including investment grade corporate
credit (BlackRock iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF (LQD)); short and
intermediate term corporate credit (BlackRock iShares Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond ETF
(IGIB), BlackRock iShares Short-Term Corporate Bond ETF (IGSB), State Street SPDR Portfolio Intermediate Term Corporate Bond ETF (SPIB), State Street SPDR Portfolio Short Term
Corporate Bond ETF (SPSB), State Street SPDR Portfolio Short Term Corporate Bond ETF
(USIG), Vanguard Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond ETF (VCIT), Vanguard Short-Term Corporate Bond ETF (VCSH); and high yield (junk) bond ETF varieties (VanEck Vectors Fallen
Angel High Yield Bond ETF (ANGL), BlackRock iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond
ETF (HYG), Xtrackers USD High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (HYLB), State Street SPDR
Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Bond ETF (JNK), BlackRock iShares 0-5 Year High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (SHYG), State Street SPDR Bloomberg Barclays Short Term High Yield Bond
ETF (SJNK), and BlackRock iShares Broad USD High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (USHY)).
126. See Cezary Podul & Dawn Lim, Fed Hires BlackRock to Help Calm Markets. It’s ETF
Business Wins Big, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (September 18, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/fed-hires-blackrock-to-help-calm-markets-its-etf-business-wins-big-11600450267.
127. Id. (“The funds the Fed ultimately did buy became even more popular with investors,
who put $48 billion into them in the first half of 2020, nearly twice the amount that went in the
year before. BlackRock funds were especially popular: They took in $34 billion, about 160%
more than in the first half of 2019.”)
128. See Jonathan Ford, Investors need to lift the lid on private equity, FINANCIAL TIMES (September 20, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/d4f55b78-2119-44de-912e-a96d3639a31f.
129. See Kaye Wiggins, How Selling to yourself became private equity’s go-to deal, FINANCIAL
TIMES (December 27th, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ee914ea4-4ad9-4eec-97c395af841122bf.
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vestor money to purchase a company already owned by a different
fund within the PE firm’s portfolio, triggering concerns about fair
market price valuations and investor transparency in the price determination process.130 At the “heart” of this transaction is a conflict of
interest, since both the buyer and the seller in the transaction is controlled by the same PE firm.131 Continuation funds highlight a fundamental incentive misalignment problem – firms who operate as asset
managers or financial intermediaries are untethered from the need to
create something productive, that benefits society in some way, in order to exact a profit. These firms can profit from financial engineering
or restructuring - often shrouded in opacity – reaping “distributive”
gains, or profits that “would otherwise be available to others and
therefore comes at their expense.”132
Another striking recent example of incentive misalignment in the
PE world is the nascently popular practice of dividend recapitalizations – an increasingly prominent part of a modern day PE company’s
“playbook.”133 In a dividend recapitalization, a PE controlled company will borrow large sums to pay out significant dividends.134 Investor and creditor demand for yield in a near-zero interest rate
environment, with corresponding aggressive government intervention
in credit markets, have fueled this strategy.135 Dividend recapitalizations have dramatically increased since the coronavirus pandemic.136
The maneuver creates an asymmetrical benefit for the PE firm at the
expense of the company, who is now saddled with more debt, while
the PE firm has locked in gains as a hedge against future setbacks.137
Massachusetts Democratic Senator, and former Presidential Candidate Elizabeth Warren has called for legislation banning PE firms
from engaging in this practice within two years of company acquisition; which proposed legislation was included in the Stop Wall Street
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Roger Bootle, THE TROUBLE WITH MARKETS, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM ITSELF, 84
(2009).
133. See Brian Spegele & Laura Cooper, Risky Loans Secure Private-Equity Payouts Despite
Downturn, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (December 17, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
risky-loans-secure-private-equity-payouts-despite-downturn-11608216781?st=q2q36i87v7savx9&
reflink=article_email_share.
134. Id.
135. See Joe Rennison, Private equity owners pile on leverage to pay themselves dividends,
FINANCIAL TIMES (September 16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/a9ff463b-01d7-4892-82dc2dbb74941a16.
136. Spegele & Cooper, supra note 132.
137. Id.
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Looting Act, which has received two readings and has now been referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.138
C. Rent Seeking and Regulatory Influence
Another misaligned incentive problem for market intermediaries is
their motivation to engage in lobbying or other measures to influence
regulators and obtain favorable regulatory treatment. The success of
banks and other financial intermediaries to obtain regulatory accommodations in the U.S. over the past fifty years, has been well documented.139 The use of regulatory policy to maintain and increase
profit, without a productive output is also known as “rent seeking.”140
It represents a “market distortion” which creates a net social welfare
loss and wealth transfer in favor of the financial industry.141 Rent
seeking has a pernicious impact on innovation and economic growth,
and high levels of rent seeking have shown to be “self-sustaining” because of its “natural increasing returns.”142
One of the more subtle, but effective, forms of rent seeking occurs
in the forum of technical rule and regulatory consultations where financial firms are hired by regulatory agencies for advisory work – essentially directing how their own interests should be regulated.143 A
European Union (EU) ombudsman recently reported a potential conflict of interest when the EU’s executive branch awarded BlackRock
138. Id.; see s.2155 – Stop Wall Street Looting Act, 116th Congress (2019-2020).
139. See Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters, WORKING PAPERS
WP153, POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST, 16-18 (2007) (Describing a variety of regulatory accommodations for banks including deregulatory measures, favorable competition restrictions, tax breaks favoring market incumbents,
labor market protection erosions, and international capital mobility expansions); see Jihad
Dagher, Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting The Political Economy of Financial Crisis, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND WORKING PAPER (January 15, 2018), 16-17, https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/15/Regulatory-Cycles-Revisiting-the-Political-Economy-of-Financial-Crises-45562; Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou Lin, Income Dynamics, Economic
Rents, and the Financialization of the U.S. Economy, 76 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 538,
544 (2011).
140. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs Of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224 (1967); Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 291 (1974); Thomas Philippon, Brief: Finance, Productivity, and Distribution, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT (October 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2018/01/philippon-october-2016.pdf;
141. Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote To Rent-Seeking? 93 CHI. KENT L. REV. 165, 167-170
(2018).
142. See Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer &Robert W Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking So
Costly to Growth? 83(2) AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 409 (1993).
143. See Dieter Holger & Dawn Lim, EU Official Raises Vetting Concerns Over BlackRock
Contract, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (November 25, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/euofficial-raises-vetting-concerns-over-blackrock-contract-11606295834?st=7ozs9nem79qsuxf&reflink=article_email_share.
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an advisory contract on future banking regulations.144 Without rigorous and consistent monitoring of consulting contracts, large asset
managers increase their influence through regulatory capture in the
form of small favorable rule changes.145 BlackRock has a clear financial incentive in obtaining such favorable treatment, and given their
size and scope, can potentially underbid other advisors (like academics, and industry practitioners) for these consulting contracts.146
BlackRock has become extremely influential with the government –
and was described recently by one reporter as “the latest chapter in a
decadelong shift in the financial power structure, with the largest asset
managers gaining ground on Wall Street banks.”147 The world’s largest asset manager was recently tapped to manage the Federal Reserve’s corporate bond buying program during the coronavirus
pandemic, alongside Pacific Investment Management Co (PIMCO)
who also assisted with commercial paper purchasing,148 BlackRock’s
job came in the form of a no-bid contract with the Fed to handle its
secondary market corporate credit purchasing facility, including primary market corporate bonds (newly issued debt), secondary market
corporate credit products (publicly traded bonds and ETFs, including
junk bonds) and agency issued commercial mortgage backed securities
through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.149 BlackRock has
directly benefited from the Fed’s invention in the credit ETF market,
using its influence to steer the purchases of numerous BlackRock issued ETFs, and reaping significant residual fee-benefits from resulting
investor surges into twenty-seven of the firm’s funds (all of which
were deemed eligible for the Fed’s buying program).150
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Dawn Lim & Gregory Zuckerman, Big Money Managers Take Lead Role in Managing Coronavirus Stimulus, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 10, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/big-money-managers-take-lead-role-in-managing-coronavirus-stimulus-11589130185?
mod=article_inline.
148. Id.
149. see Annie Massa, Why BlackRock Has a Role in the Fed Bond-Buying Spree, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (March 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-25/whyblackrock-has-a-role-in-the-fed-bond-buying-spree-quicktake. BlackRock was issued a “no-bid”
contract to assist the Federal Reserve during the 2008 financial crisis (“in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve turned to BlackRock to oversee $130 billion in distressed debt formerly on the books of Bear Stearns Cos. and American International Group.”)
150. See Podul & Lim, supra note 125 (“BlackRock’s share of assets increased in 27 funds
Morningstar Inc. analysts deemed potentially eligible for the Fed program. BlackRock’s share
grew from 51% on March 20 to about 56% on July 23, when the Fed last bought ETFs, according
to Morningstar.”); see Andera Riquier, The Fed has bought $8.7 billion worth of ETFs. Here are
the details. MARKETWATCH (September 21, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-fedhas-been-buying-etfs-what-does-it-mean-11600704182
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D. The Politics, Influence and Conflicts of Index Construction
The passive investing revolution has also made markets more susceptible to misaligned incentives, political manipulation, and conflicts
of interest. A recent study described the process of index construction151 by commercial providers (prominently Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI), Standard & Poor’s (S&P), FTSE Russell, and
Dow Jones Indices (DCI)) as an “inherently political” one, where
“private authority” is conferred, not through democratic processes,
but rather as form of “de facto regulatory power” through the exercise
of index inclusion discretion.152 The decision to include or exclude a
company can result in billions of dollars of capital flows either towards
or away from domestic economies.153 Inclusionary decisions are influenced by index providers’ normative assessments of a company’s governance.154 Further, many countries, particularly emerging
economies, lack the power to challenge exclusionary decisions, with
little to no recourse for being passed over as “investment worthy,”
added to a negatively associated “watchlist,” or being labelled as a
“frontier” market.155
The political element of index inclusionary decisions was prominently manifest in MSCI’s decision to include Chinese companies in
its major indices, resulting in significant capital flows to China.156
Studies on index construction also reveal certain “network externalities” preserving the market authority (and political power) of the largest index providers including a first-mover “capture” of national and
regional markets, the fact that equity investors “benchmark” their
151. An “index” is a representative measure of the performance of an underlying “basket” of
assets, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Fast Answers Market Indices, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersindiceshtm.html (last accessed June 27, 2020) (hereinafter “SEC Indices”).
152. See Johannes Petry, Jan Fichtner & Eelke Heemskerk, Steering capital: the growing private authority of index providers in the age of passive asset management, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (2019), (“Arguably, in this new age of passive asset management
index providers are to equity markets what credit rating agencies are to bond markets – critical
gatekeepers that exert de facto regulatory power.”)
153. Id. at 155 (“Their new authority was not delegated from the public sphere, but gradually
emerged as part of a transformation of the index provider industry – from primarily supplying
information about markets to becoming private authorities that are able to set standards on
corporate governance and steer international capital flows.”)
154. Id. at 154 (“Index providers therefore play a role as standard-setters: their notions on
what constitutes good corporate governance at the level of the firm and a favorable investment
environment at the level of (national) markets helps or hinders firms and countries in attracting
capital, essentially deciding what is investment-worthy in global financial markets.”)
155. Id. at 167-68.
156. See Mike Bird, How China Pressured MSCI to Add Its Market To Major Benchmark,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-pressuredmsci-to-add-its-market-to-major-benchmark-11549195201.
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performance to the longest standing indices, and their use as an underlying reference for a variety of derivatives contracts.157 These index providers are also currently subject to very light regulation,
despite being susceptible to manipulation, conflicts, and bias.158
A unique set of conflicts, and market inefficiencies, emerge when
asset managers construct a bespoke index for a single ETF or Mutual
Fund (which unique index is often licensed through an affiliate entity)
- a phenomenon cited by Professor Adrianna Robertson as existing in
an “overwhelming majority” of fund structures.159 Given the ubiquity
of bespoke indices constructed for single funds, Robertson called nomenclature in passive investing misleading, and suggested they should
be more appropriately described as a form of “delegated management.”160 There are numerous market externalities that emanate
from bespoke index creation or affiliate index licensing. First, unexperienced investors might be harmed (even subject to predation) if
asset managers obscure, or bury, their fee disclosures for affiliated index licensing costs.161 Second, performance assessments of similar
funds are nearly impossible to perform when benchmarks are heterogeneously constructed.162 Further obscuring investor comparisons are
the fact that funds with similar names often have very different underlying holdings,163 methodologies of calculating their underlying
NAV,164 and variable cash management and securities lending practices.165 The harder it is for investors to compare funds, the less likely
it is that risk and capital will be efficiently allocated.166
E. Fund Portfolio Composition and Proxy Voting Conflicts
Asset managers who make active portfolio composition choices
(like in non-index mutual funds and actively managed exchange
traded funds) also have conflicts of interest, and misaligned incentives,
157. See Petry, Fichtner & Heemskerk, supra note 151 at 158.
158. See Robert J. Jackson & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What’s Really In Your Index Fund?
New York Times (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/opinion/index-fund.html
159. See Adriana Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and ‘Index Investing’, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795, 833, 836 (2019).
160. See id. at 796-798.
161. See id. at 834-835, 841.
162. See id. at 797-798, 805-806; see Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48.
163. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 7, 26-32.
164. Id. at 15-17.
165. Id. at 23-26.
166. See Megan Greene, Passive Investing Is Storing Up Trouble, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 2,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/cdbdd01a-95b4-11e8-95f8-8640db9060a7; Sushko & Turner,
supra note 62 at 114, 199; See Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance,
27(2) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3, 6 (2013).
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which can lead them to make investment inclusion decisions that are
entirely unrelated to economic fundamentals of companies.167 In fact,
enlightening new research from Professor John Coffee reveals that asset managers may intentionally neglect idiosyncratic risk factors of underlying portfolio companies in favor of systemic governance
measures, since doing so is economically rational.168 Coffee observes
that “fundamental transitions” characterize modern financial markets
– driven by institutional investor’s dominating both trading and ownership concentration (largely through fund intermediation), while increasing the demand for environmental, social and governance (ESG)
disclosures.169
Coffee notes that in this transition “sharp conflicts” have emerged
in the disclosure preferences of asset managers (as institutional common owners) and individual (often retail) investors: asset managers, as
common owners, are the ultimate diversified investor, and are primarily concerned with the systematic risk factor (undiversifiable risk),170
and thus seek out greater ESG disclosures.171 As fully diversified
common owners, asset managers vote “portfolio wide,” and seek to
maximize the value of the portfolio as a whole, not the value of individual stocks,172 and in so doing they have incentives to encourage
risky behavior in individual companies, while mitigating non-diversifiable systematic risk.173 Undiversified retail investors tend to have the
opposite perspective and preferences.174 This presents a doubleedged sword since systematic risk will decrease over time, but idiosyncratic risk will increase for individual companies (leading to more individual company failure).175
167. See Nitish Kumar, Yuehua Tang & Kelsey D. Wei, Quid Pro Quo: Evidence from Mutual
Funds as Friendly Shareholders of Investment Banks, UNPUBLISHED WORKING PAPER (December 14, 2020), at 30, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3711791.
168. See John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic
Risk, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE - LAW WORKING PAPER 541/2020 ((September 21, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678197.
169. Id.
170. Modern portfolio theory posits that the riskiness of an asset is comprised of two factors,
an “idiosyncratic” risk factor (also called “unsystematic risk”) that is unique to the asset (or
company), and a “systemic” risk factor that is common to the market. See Markowitz, supra
note 61; W.F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of
Risk, 19(3) JOURNAL OF FINANCE 425 (1964); J. Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the
Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47(1) REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 13 (1965)
171. Coffee, supra note 167 at 1, 4, 37.
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id. at 1, 5-6, 37.
174. Id. at 21.
175. Id. at 35-37.
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Research has shown that mutual fund investment and voting decisions are influenced by business relationships with underlying portfolio companies.176 Recent empirical studies by researchers at the
University of Florida and the University of Texas at Dallas revealed
that mutual funds, as a form of “quid pro quo” to investment banks,
were nearly twice as likely to invest in the stocks of an investment
bank if the fund company (or family of funds) had a brokerage business relationship.177 Mutual fund proxy voting decisions were also
shown in this study to be biased towards management of “connected”
brokerages on contentious shareholder matters,178 and IPO allocation
decisions.179 In return, these investment banks provide a steady
stream of “exclusive” benefits to the asset managers including, among
others, “tipping” on analyst research,180 execution services,181 preferences on underpriced initial public offerings,182 access to information
about “proprietary order flow,”183 and non-public information about
investment banking clients.184
F. SPAC Sponsor Incentive Misalignments
An increasingly popular financial intermediation structure is a “special purpose acquisition company” - commonly known by its acronym
SPAC – which uses investor cash, raised through a short-term public
176. See L. Cohen & B. Schmidt, Attracting flows by attracting big clients, 64 JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 2125 (2009); D. Cvijanoviæ, A. Dasgupta & K.E. Zachariadis, Ties that bind: How
business connections affect mutual fund activism 71 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2933 (2016).
177. See Kumar, Tang & Wei supra note 166 at 1, 2 (“Institutional investors manage trillions
of dollars of assets and are prized clients of investment banks because they often pay billions of
dollars in brokerage commissions per year and pay an important role in the underwriting
business.”)
178. See id. at 3. The “friendly” voting dynamic noted in the study was also noted in circumstances where Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) was recommending voting against management. This is a significant finding (and evidence of bias) in light of other research documenting
the propensity of asset managers to follow ISS recommendations. see P. Iliev & M. Lowry, Are
mutual funds active voters? 28 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 446 (2015).
179. See Kumar, Tang & Wei supra note 166 at 22, 30.
180. See P. Irvine, M. Lipson & A. Puckett, Tipping. 20 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 20,
741 (2007); J. L. Juergens & L. Lindsey, Getting out early: An analysis of market making activity
at the recommending analyst’s firm 64 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 64, 2327 (2009).
181. See Kumar, Yang & Wei, supra note 166.
182. See J. Reuter, Are IPO allocations for sale? Evidence from mutual funds, 61 JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 2289 (2006); M. Nimalendran, J.R. Ritter & D. Zhang, Do today’s trades affect tomorrow’s IPO allocations? 84 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 87 (2007).
183. See A. Barbon, M. Di Maggio, F. Franzoni, & A. Landier, Brokers and order flow leakage: Evidence from fire sales, 74 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2707 (2019); M. Di Maggio, F. Franzoni,
A. Kermani & C. Sommavilla, C., The relevance of broker networks for information diffusion in
the stock market, 134 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 419 (2019).
184. See N. Kumar, K. Mullally, S. Ray & Y. Tang, Prime (information) brokerage, 137 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 371 (2020)
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offering of a corporate shell, to merge with an operational private
company.185 SPAC sponsors (often hedge or PE firms or well-connected executives) receive a “promote” - a material equity stake in the
SPAC for a nominal purchase price - and options to purchase warrants
in the SPAC, and these benefits often materialize significant profits for
the sponsor, even on companies that struggle post-SPAC, because of
the promotes exceptionally low acquisition cost.186
Hedge fund billionaire Bill Ackman has specifically criticized the
“misaligned incentives” in the compensation structure of SPACs between sponsor interests and ordinary investors (including long-term
shareholders) since the discounted shares, and other standard fees,
create a “drag” on the latter’s returns.187 Recent research from
Professors Michael Klausner and Michael Ohlrogge shows that costs
built into SPAC structures are “subtle, opaque and far higher than
previously recognized.”188 Klausner and Ohlrogge posit that investors
“bear the cost of dilution built into the SPAC structure” and effectively “subsidize” the company since for every $10 per share that an
SPAC raises, by the time it merges with its target this amount has been
effectively reduced to $6.67 due to embedded costs.189 The authors
also identify an additional “incentive misalignment” between sponsors
and ordinary investors in the common practice of the sponsors infusing the SPAC initial public offering with several hundred million dollars because the investment will be lost if a merger doesn’t take place;
therefore the sponsor may pressure the SPAC to merge on terms unattractive to long-term shareholders.190

185. See Ortenca Aliaj, Sujeet Indap & Miles Kruppa, The Spac sponsor bonanza, FINANCIAL
TIMES (November 12, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9b481c63-f9b4-4226-a639-238f9fae4dfc;
This critique is becoming increasingly common lately and the problem of SPAC incentive misalignment been noted in a variety of other recent media, or advocacy group reports. See Margot
Patrick and Amrith Ramkumar, “Led by ‘Mr. SPAC,’ Credit Suisse Cashes In on Blank-Check
Spree,” WALL STREET JOURNAL (February 5, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/led-by-mr-spaccredit-suisse-cashes-in-on-blank-check-spree11612527389?mod=article_inline; see AMERICANS
FOR FINANCIAL REFORM, LETTER TO MEMBERS OF HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE
(February 16, 2021), available at https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/
AFR-Letter-on-SPACs-to-HFSC-FINAL.pdf.
186. See Ortenca, Indap & Kruppa, supra note 184.
187. Id.
188. See Michael D. Klausner & Michael A. Ohlrogge, Sober Look at SPACs, STANFORD
LAW AND ECONOMICS OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 559, NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH
PAPER NO. 20-48 (October 28, 2020), 1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3720919
189. Id at 3-4.
190. Id. at 20.
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G. Indirect Payments, Revenue Sharing and Pension Intermediaries
Pension administrators are susceptible to conflicted enticements
through indirect payments in the form of “revenue-sharing” arrangements offered by third-party fund companies.191 These opaque benefits “allow recordkeepers to extract additional rents from plan
participants” and have been shown in a study of the 1000 largest
401(k) pension plans in the U.S. from 2009 to 2013 to affect the “menu
design” of available funds – and not “offset” by lower direct fund fees,
or better performance of the offered funds.192 The compensation enticements noted in the study took the form of “rebates” received by
recordkeepers from mutual fund companies.193 In other words, the
fund company charged investors recordkeeping expenses in their expense ratio but passed the recordkeeping fee back to the plan
recordkeeper.194 Fund companies that offered these rebates were
highly favored by plans, and more likely to be retained, despite often
having higher expense ratios, while the revenue sharing benefits
weren’t passed down to investors in the form of lower expense
ratios.195
H. Perception Deception: Fund Names and “Greenwashing”
A significant multi-pronged challenge in investment funds (particularly ETFs) is that there aren’t established fund naming or index consistency conventions.196 This creates several potential problems for
investors and creates misaligned incentives for market intermediaries.
For example, investors may have difficulty distinguishing conventional
ETFs from other products like levered or inverse ETPs, or unsecured
debt instruments called exchange traded notes (ETNs).197 Further,
191. See Veronika Krepely Pool, Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, Mutual Fund Revenue
Sharing in 401(k) Plans, WORKING PAPER (December 20, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3752296
192. Id. at 35.
193. Id at 1.
194. Id. at 26.
195. Id. at 35. This study supports prior research showing conflicts of interest and rent extraction in compensation incentives for pension intermediaries and service providers, see R. Inderst
& M. Ottaviani, How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer protection, 105 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 393 (2012); N.M. Stoughton, Y. Wu, & J. Zechner, Intermediated investment management, 66 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 947(2011); and general conflicts of
interest existing between plan sponsors and mutual fund companies, see V.K. Pool, C. Sialm & I.
Stefanescu (2016). It pays to set the menu: Mutual fund investment options in 401(k) plans, 71
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 71, 1779 (2016)
196. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 26-30.
197. In March 2020 it was reported that unaware investors who were “burned” when issuing
banks evoked redemption rights in complex debt-based exchange traded notes had engaged litigation, see Akane Otani & Sebastian Pellejero, Bankrupt in Just Two Weeks’ – Individual Inves-
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two funds can have similar names despite entirely different underlying
portfolios,198 leading one commentator to call ETFs a “vaudeville
act.”199 The potential for ETF issuers to capitalize on idiosyncratic
trends,200 or “factor” focused funds (like value investing) is tremendous in ETFs, and investors may not perform comprehensive due diligence on whether a fund’s underlying portfolio holdings align with its
name.201
Another misaligned incentive in market intermediation is that of
“greenwashing,” – proactive public signals, not backed by operational
evidence, that a firm is engaging in sustainability practices.202
Whether the pursuit of sustainability goals is worthwhile or justifiable
is the subject of live academic debate.203 Professors Lucian Bebchuk
and Roberto Tallarita argue that stakeholder governance, the primary
mechanism for ESG initiatives, is both “inadequate” and “counterproductive,” and also imposes “major costs” and could stand in the
tors Get Burned by Collapse of Complex Securities, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 1, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankrupt-in-just-two-weeksindividual-investorsget-burned-by-collapse-of-complex-securities-11591020059.
198. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 26, 27.
199. See GRANT’S INTEREST RATE OBSERVER, On the ETF Divide, Volume 34, No. 19b (October 14, 2016).
200. Sloane Ortel, Paul Kovarsky & Antonella Puca, How to see the hidden risks of ETFs,
CFA INSTITUTE (January 1, 2018), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2018/01/18/howto-seethe-hidden-risks-of-etfs/
201. See George Athanassakos, Why investors aren’t getting true value stocks with value ETFs,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (October 2, 2019), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/
etfs/article-why-investors-arentgetting-true-value-stocks-with-value-etfs/.
202. See Hao Liang, Lin Sun & Melvyn Teo, Greenwashing, WORKING PAPER, 1 (May 26,
2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3610627; Other conflicts between intermediaries and
investors have been noted in an emerging literature around this subject including conflicts in
relation to pension trustees fulfilling their fiduciary duty of loyalty, see Max Matthew
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law
and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee 72 STAN LAW REV. 381 (2020).
203. Compare Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, 52 (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds. 2018); Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum & Karessa L.
Cain, Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec.
10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020/;
Colin Mayer, Shareholderism versus Stakeholderism – A Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto
Tallarita 10 (EUROPEAN CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 522/2020, 2020),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/mayerfinal.pdf [all in support of
stakeholder governance]; against Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,
93 VA. L. REV. 675, 729–32 (2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 908–13 (2005); Robert C. Clark, Harmony or Dissonance - The
Good Governance Ideas of Academics and Worldly Players, 70 BUS. LAW. 321, 338 (2015); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power
and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015) [all expressing skepticism of stakeholder governance].

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\19-1\DPB101.txt

32

unknown

Seq: 32

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

20-AUG-21

11:14

[Vol. 19:1

way of meaningful protection for stakeholders.204 Investor demand
for ESG considerations in portfolio decision-making creates a potential conflict of interest (and misaligned incentive) for asset managers
to “deceptively endorse” sustainability principles (like the United National Principles for Responsible Investment205) to attract capital flows,
without ensuring ESG principles are reflected in investment decisions.206 There is an inherent agency conflict here, since investor capital flows are influenced by both investor preferences (like ESG) and
fund performance (alpha).207 Therefore, if actual ESG measures are a
drag on performance, fund managers may jettison sustainable businesses, despite prior ESG signaling.208 Thus ESG becomes an ex ante
marketing strategy, not an ex post guiding investment ethos. Relatedly, ESG investing imposes subjectivity, and “substantial information
acquisition costs” on an asset manager, which increases incentives to
abandon it after investment capital is captured.209
I. Who Benefits from Volatility and Destabilized Markets?
Between January 25th and January 29th, 2021 the U.S. stock market
witnessed an ostensible “revolution” as retail stock traders in a matter
of days, powered by the fintech stock trading app Robinhood, bid up
the prices of several stocks like the video game retailer GameStop
(GME) to over 500 percent of their value.210 The driving force behind
this remarkable surge was a coordinated attack, organized through the
Reddit forum WallStreetBets (WSB), and other social media channels
and online forums, against several hedge funds who had outstanding
short positions in GME and other companies negatively affected by
the coronavirus pandemic.211 WSB publicly conceived a plan to
“short squeeze” these funds by buying and holding GME stock and
204. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, forthcoming, CORNELL L. REV (December 2020), HARVARD LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO.1052, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544978 (the authors
strongly advocate that “Stakeholderism” should be rejected and that “external interventions”
should take place to protect stakeholder interests “via legislation, regulation and policy design.”)
205. See PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, https://www.unpri.org/ (last accessed
January 11, 2021).
206. See Hao Liang, Lin Sun & Melvyn Teo, Greenwashing, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (November 17, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/
17/greenwashing/.
207. Id.
208. See Liang, Sun & Teo, supra note 201.
209. Id.
210. See Jason Zweig, The Real Force Driving the GameStop Revolution, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (January 30, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-real-force-driving-the-gamestopamc-blackberry-revolution-11611965586.
211. Id.
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call options to drive the price so high that the hedge funds would be
forced to buy back the stock or close their positions at dramatic
losses.212 Incredibly the plan worked, resulting in the hedge fund Melvin Capital losing 53% of its value.213 Days into the squeeze,
Robinhood, the fintech discount brokerage at the heart of the retail
buying frenzy, placed buying restrictions on GameStop and similarly
surging stocks of companies like AMC, Bed Bath & Beyond, and
Nokia, which quickly prompted a class action lawsuit from aggrieved
retail investors.214
In the aftermath of the GameStop saga the Wall Street Journal revealed that many of the early purchasers of the stock were not “Reddit day traders or Discord users” but hedge funds, including Senvest
Management LLC who reaped a whopping $700 million profit from
their position in the beleaguered video game retailer.215 While the
episode was widely framed as a “triumph of amateurs over professionals” the truth is much different – with hedge funds reaping a tremendous share of the distributive gains.216 Ironically, the most likely
“victim” in a hedge fund short squeeze is actually a pension benefactor - often a union worker or employee who relies on the fund’s stability for retirement planning.217 Market intermediaries are the only true
winners from a destabilized, highly volatile market, untethered from
fundamentals, with enhanced retail participation. Fintech firms like
Robinhood encourage investors to trade frequently (the more the better) since they sell the execution of their stock and options trades
(known as “payment for order flow”) to HFT market makers like Citadel Securities or Virtue,218 and also facilitate the use of leverage, and
212. See Alexis Goldstein, What happened with Gamestop? MARKETS WEEKLY (January 28,
2021), https://marketsweekly.ghost.io/what-happened-with-gamestop/.
213. See Jazmin Goodwin, Melvin Capital hedge fund lost 53% in the GameStop frenzy, CNN
BUSINESS (February 1, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/31/investing/melvin-capital-redditgamestop/index.html.
214. See Fernando Alfonso III, Class-action lawsuit filed against Robinhood following outrage
over GameStop stock restriction, CNN BUSINESS (January 29, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/
01/28/investing/lawsuit-robinhood-gamestop-wallstreetbets/index.html.
215. See Juliet Chung, This Hedge Fund Made $700 Million on GameStop, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (February 3, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-hedge-fund-made-700-million-ongamestop-11612390687.
216. Id.
217. See Eric Reguly, The real victims in the GameStop madness are the pension funds, not
the hedge fund bosses, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (January 29, 2021), https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-real-victims-in-the-gamestop-madness-are-the-pension-funds-not-the/.
218. See Kate Rooney & Maggie Fitzgerald, Here’s How Robinhood is raking in record cash
on customer trades – despite making it free, CNBC (August 13, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/08/13/how-robinhood-makes-money-on-customer-trades-despite-making-it-free.html.
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the purchase of option contracts by unexperienced investors “as easily
as they purchase a latte.”219 The huge profitability potential for options trading creates a significant conflict of interest for Robinhood
and other fintech online brokerages.220 HFT firms thrive, and profit,
in volatility markets while also potentially “undermining efficient capital allocation.”221
Trading activity and volume has also surged with the nascent popularity of ETFs.222 They also revealed themselves as the “tool of
choice” for many traders in the March 2020 coronavirus crisis.223
Higher ETF turnover benefits online brokerages like Robinhood and
other fintechs interfacing with retail investors drawn into purchasing
thematic ETFs.224 Yet higher retail participation in the markets likely
represents a net wealth transfer away from Main Street in favor of
Wall Street, resulting in even deeper wealth inequality,225 since the
vast majority of retail investors will underperform market averages.226
The firms truly better off by heightened volatility and accelerated
trading are firms who provide no productive by-products at all, but
rather perform some utility within an increasingly complex financial
market infrastructure, like HFT, market making firms,227 or ETF arbitrageurs, some of which may also becoming systemically important in
the process.228
219. Deborah B. Soloman, Gensler Faces Big Challenge in Tackling GameStop’s Wild Ride,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (February 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/business/economy/gamestop-sec.html
220. Rooney & Fitzgerald, supra note 217.
221. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VANDERBILT LAW REV. 1607 (2015)
222. See Steve Johnson, ETF trading surges on European stock Exchanges, FINANCIAL TIMES
(January 24, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/1c527341-e99a-4312-8ba2-a23abc63f0
45?shareType=nongift.
223. Dawn Lim & Mischa Frankl-Duval, In Market Rout, ETFs Are Where The Action Is,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-market-routetfs-are-where-the-action-is-11584270000.
224. See Ksenia Galouchko, Robinhood effect is starting to shake up a stuffy ETF market BNN
BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/robinhood-effect-is-starting-toshake-up-a-stuffy-etf-market-1.1467788.
225. There is evidence of a relationship between heavily financialized economies and increased income and wealth inequality. N.van der Zwan, Making sense of financialization. 12
SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW 99 (2014); Basak Kus, Financialization and Income Inequality in
OECD Nations: 1995-2007, 43(4) THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW 477, 492 (2012).
226. See Wayne Duggan, Why Investing As An Individual Is So Difficult, MARKETWATCH
(December 11, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-investing-as-an-individual-is-sodifficult-2019-12-11.
227. See Scott Patterson & Alexander Osipovich, High-Frequency Traders Feast on Volatile
Market, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-frequency-traders-feast-on-volatile-market-11585310401
228. See Wigglesworth, supra note 85.
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SHARED COSTS

A. Perpetual Debt Generation & the “Global Doom Loop”
Debt has played a pervasive role in the evolution of post-war American culture.229 Highly influential contemporary French economist
Thomas Piketty has extensively documented the prominence of debt
in modern society, and how it influences social factors like income and
wealth inequality.230 Minsky also noted that a “fundamental characteristic of the modern international economic structure is that strong
financial linkages exist among the various national entities.”231 These
linkages include financial asset ownership, as well as payment commitments on debt.232 Minsky suggested, however, that since debt principle could be perpetually “rolled over,” commitments to repay were
only enforced on a default of periodic interest payments.233 Studies on
Minsky’s MMC have also noted how this evolved capitalistic system
prioritizes capital gains (asset inflation), while promoting debt and
“collateral based lending over income based lending,” as such, it’s
prone to volatile asset price movements.234
Professors Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova have identified how
private market intermediaries now play an integral role in both the
modulation and allocation of new credit.235 One of the many misaligned incentives in our modern financialized system is the misallocation of credit, away from productive enterprise, and back into the
financial system.236 Professor Katharina Pistor has persuasively illustrated how market intermediaries sit at the control panel of a financial
machine that perpetually “mints” debt-based instruments that are
cash convertible, widely traded, durable, and confer powerful priority
rights on their holders.237 Pistor posits that the result of this debt
proliferation incentive (which also uses a variety of legal mechanisms
such as trusts, collateral, contract law and the corporation238) is a
229. See L. Hyman, Debtor Nation: How Consumer Credit Built Postwar America, 9 ENTERSOCIETY 614, 614-18 (2008).
230. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST Century (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2017); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL AND IDEOLOGY (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 2020)
231. See Minsky, Money Manager Capitalism, supra note 1 at 23.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 24.
234. See Tymoigne & Wray, surpa note 27 at 51.
235. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1143, 1149, 1153-1155 (2017).
236. Id. at 1214.
237. KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2019) at 77-108.
238. Id. at 86.
PRISE AND
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highly volatile, complex and hierarchal financial system.239 The 2008
crisis evidenced how financialized, and layered debt, could destructively wreak havoc through the financial system.240
Professor Arthur Wilmarth has convincingly illustrated how governments persistently intervene in markets to rescue universal banks who
arrive at precarious junctures due to their own profit seeking behaviors.241 The linked interdependence between the sovereign, the large
universal banks (UB), the global “shadow banks” (SB) (who are often
the same market intermediaries profiled in this article), investors, and
creditors has generated what Wilmarth calls a “global doom loop.”242
He describes this destructive (and perpetuating) cycle as follows: first,
central banks provide “too-big-to-fail” guarantees to UBs and large
SBs and frequently use stabilizing intervention in the economy (like
quantitative easing (QE)); second, with the “support of easy money”
central bank policies, these UBs and SBs increasingly finance public
and private sector debt; third, buoyed by the easy credit generation,
investors and creditors take larger risks because they know the government will intervene in a crisis.243
The “global doom loop” was perpetuated during March 2020
coronavirus pandemic financial crash, and further illustrates the government’s willingness to use aggressive liquidity measures to intervene
in financialized products that generate system-wide instability. In addition to propping up unravelling bond and credit ETF markets,244 the
Fed acted as “the world’s backup lender,”245 with several reports also
remarking on the Fed’s embrace of “QE infinity.”246 Professor L.
Randall Wray noted how Minsky foresaw that in MMC, financial market participants would “adjust their expectations to include government bailouts should anything go wrong.”247 Wray suggests
239. Id. at 79.
240. See id. at 48, 87, 99;
241. ARTHUR E. WILMARTH JR., TAMING THE MEGABANKS, WHY WE NEED A NEW GLASSSTEAGALL ACT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 265-298.
242. Id. at 12-13, 320, 325-27, 353-55.
243. Id. at 12.
244. See Riquier, supra note 106.
245. Serena Ng & Nick Timiraos, Covid Supercharges Federal Reserve as Backup Lender to
the World, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (August 3, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-fed
eral-reserve-jerome-powell-covid-coronavirus-dollar-lending-economy-foreign-currency-115
96228151.
246. See Robert Guy, Why the Fed went nuclear with QE Infinity, FINANCIAL REVIEW (March
24, 2020), https://www.afr.com/markets/equity-markets/why-the-fed-went-nuclear-with-qe-infinity-20200324-p54d8x; Michael Mackenzie, The Federal Reserve has gone well past the point of
‘QE Infinity’, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/11b338a2-6d0c11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
247. Wray, supra note 19 at 40.
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“ironically, the success of the interventions encourages more risk taking.”248 This perfectly describes the 2020 Fed bailouts of bad corporate debt and credit ETFs,249 and the perpetual drivers powering the
“global doom loop.”250
B. The Shared Social Costs of Liquidity Transformation
Credit ETFs lead to shared costs when they perform a “liquidity
transformation” and turn thinly traded and often opaque bonds and
loans into highly liquid ETFs.251 The integrity of these products is
contingent on other financial firms, under market incentives, to perform a stabilizing “arbitrage” function.252 Discretionary arbitrage as a
stabilizing mechanism has proven to be historically fragile in a crisis.253 Here “animal spirits” reign,254 market discipline deteriorates,255
248. Id.
249. See Jeff Cox, The Fed bought more blue-chip and junk bonds, and has started making
Main Street loans, CNBC (August 10, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/10/the-fed-boughtmore-blue-chip-and-junk-bonds-and-has-started-making-main-streetloans.html#:~:text=in%20addition%2C%20the%20Fed%20stepped,pandemic%20and%20then
%20were%20downgraded.
250. See Wilmarth, supra note 240.
251. See Clements, New Funds I, supra note 79 at 32-34 (2020); Randall W. Forsyth, Corporate
Credit Could Be the Next Bubble to Burst, BARRON’S (Feb. 15, 2019, 11:42 AM), https://
www.barrons.com/articles/debt-be-not-proud-danger-in-the-complacency-about-corporatecredit-51550248974 (quoting Stephanie Pomboy, “In 2007, the lie was that you could take a cornucopia of crap, package it together, and somehow make it AAA,” she says. “This time, the lie is
that you can take a bunch of bonds that trade by appointment, lump them together in an ETF,
and magically make them liquid.”); see Stephen Foley, The Alchemy of ETF Liquidity is an
Illusory Promise, FINANCIAL TIMES (April 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/cc44cd76-d91811e4-b907-00144feab7de
252. The necessity of discretionary intermediation to perform a stabilizing arbitrage function
to maintain ETF integrity has been cited frequently, see Clements, New Funds I, supra note 79 at
30-32; Clements, Are ETFs, supra note 48 at 812-814; Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework For Exchange Traded Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 853 (2018); Henry T.C. Hu
& John Morley, The SEC and Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Commendable Start and
a Welcome Invitation., 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1196 (2019); CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND, Exchange Traded Fund Discussion Paper (2017), 41-51, available at https://www.centralbank.ie/
docs/default-source/publications/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-6/discussion-paper-6—-exchange-traded-funds.pdf; DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, The Next Crisis Will
Be Different: Opportunities To Continue Enhancing Financial Stability 10 Years After Lehman’s
Insolvency, INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER (September 2018) at 13-14; Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange Traded Funds, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPER NO. 343 (April 2011), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/
work343.pdf.
253. See Clements, New Funds I, supra note at 45-51. A clear example from recent history is
the failure of index arbitrageurs to stabilize price differentials between equity and futures markets during the Black Monday crash of October 19, 1987, see Mark Carlson, A Brief History of
the 1987 Stock Market Crash With A Discussion of The Federal Reserve Response, FINANCE AND
ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVISIONS OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS AND MONETARY AF-
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investor herds form around information cascades and noise,256 and
prices become an unreliable signal of fundamental information.257
The costs of liquidity transformation manifested in the early March
2020 coronavirus selloff, when credit ETFs traded at historic price discounts from NAV.258 Assumptions failed, arbitrage (again) proved to
be fragile in a crisis as intermediaries managed their own internal risks
and backed away from performing their discretionary stabilizing function.259 It was only after an unprecedented intervention into credit
markets (including the purchasing of bond ETFs) by the Federal Reserve that prices and NAVs stabilized and re-aligned.260 In the immeFAIRS,

FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, (publishing abbreviations), Nov. 2006, at 11 available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf.
254. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 116-130
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 2010).
255. The concept of “market discipline” implies that firms will continually make rational decisions, including buying under-valued assets as a stabilizing arbitrage function. However, history
proves that market discipline is illusive, and fragile, in a crisis. See David Min, Understanding
The Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015). For example, market discipline proved fragile during the Auction Rate Securities failure in the lead up to the 2008 global
financial crisis. See Joe Prendergast, Craig McCann & Eddie O’Neal, Auction Rate Securities, 16
No. 4 PIABA B.J. 383 (2009). Market discipline also proved fragile in the wholesale funding
market runs during the 2008 crisis. See Michal Kowalik, Opacity and Disclosure in Short-Term
Wholesale Funding Markets, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON WORKING PAPER RPA 16-02,
1 (Sep. 15, 2016); William O. Fisher, Predicting a Heart Attack: The Fundamental Opacity of
Extreme Liquidity Risk, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 485 (2014).
256. An information cascade emerges “when people form beliefs based upon the belief or
opinion of others” see Bryan Druzin & Jessica Li, Censorship’s Fragile Grip on The Internet: Can
Online Speech Be Controlled, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 369, 387-88 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, Wall
Street’s Lemmings, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 10, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/63023/
wall-streets-lemmings; Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During
and After A Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2011); M. Humayun Kabir, Did Investors
Herd During The Financial Crisis? Evidence From The US Financial Industry, 18(1) INT’L REV.
FINE. 59 (2018); Robert C. Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure of
Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FINIAL. PERSPS. (2015); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1077-78 (2018).
257. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52(1) J. FINE. 35, 38
(1997) (“performance-based arbitrage is particularly ineffective in extreme circumstances, where
prices are significantly out of line and arbitrageurs are fully invested. In these circumstances,
arbitrageurs might bail out of the market when their participation is most needed.”)
258. Trading price discounts were ubiquitous in the credit market during this period and affected a variety of ETF types including high-yield and “junk” varieties, investment grade corporate credit funds, and even normally “ultra-stable” short-maturity (near cash) bond ETFs. See
Chappatta, supra note 115; Gillian Tett, supra note 115; Riquier, supra note 115; Clements, supra
note 112; Marc Gerstein, Why Your Supposedly Stable Fixed-Income ETF Fell Off A Cliff,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcgerstein/2020/03/23/why-your-supposedly-stable-fixed-income-etf-fell-off-a-cliff/#7a1c08bf7ba5.
259. See Aramonte & Avalos, supra note 113 at 1-4; Lim, supra note 115.
260. See Greifeld, supra note 117; Greifeld & Kawa, supra note 120; Aramonte & Avalos,
supra note 113 at 4.
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diate wake of the ETF price dislocation a frequent industry
explanation was that ETFs were performing “price discovery” for underlying bonds.261 There are many good reasons to be skeptical of this
narrative, including the fact that mutual funds with identical portfolios
(and which calculated their NAVs in the same way) were not similarly
dislocated, which if the price discovery argument is correct implies
that the mutual funds were mispriced.262 One researcher called the
price discovery argument a form of “heads I win, tails you lose” by the
industry because when ETFs are aligned with NAV they operate as
intended (and are an improvement on closed-end funds), yet when
they dislocate they are performing price discovery!263
Before the coronavirus crash in March 2020 there was growing evidence that firms, and other institutional investors were using ultrashort duration credit ETFs as cash and near cash substitutes, in their
liquidity management operations.264 The price dislocations in credit
ETFs during the coronavirus selloff are fundamentally derived from
the fact that these investment credit products perform a liquidity
transformation by packaging over-the-counter, and often thinly traded
bonds and loans into instantly liquid secondary market product.265
These products work, until they don’t, and history shows us that liquidity transformation often leads to governmental intervention and
support in a crisis.266 The more opaque, and mismatched the asset
261. See Lewis Braham, The Coronavirus Crash Reveals a Big Problem in Bond Fund Pricing,
BARRON’S (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/coronavirus-crash-bond-fund-pricing-problem-51585848504.
262. Id.
263. See David Tuckwell, Bond ETF discounts are not ‘price discovery’ ETF STREAM (Mar. 19,
2020), https://www.etfstream.com/features/bond-etf-discounts-are-not-price-discovery/.
264. See Pagano, Serrano & Zechner, supra note 104 at 3-4, 28-29; Greifeld, supra note 116;
Stephen Gandel, supra note 116; Max Chen, Wary Investors Can Turn To Cash Alternative,
Ultra-Short-Duration Bond ETFs, ETF TRENDS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.etftrends.com/fixedincome-channel/wary-investors-can-turn-to-cash-alternative-ultra-short-duration-bond-etfs/
?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=readMore
265. See Stephen Gandel, supra note 116.
266. There have been numerous instances where government intervention was necessary to
remedy systemic problems associated with liquidity transformation. In 2008 the government had
to bail out the money market mutual fund (MMMF) sector, which had performed a liquidity
transformation by turning short term instruments like commercial paper originated in the
“shadow banking” sector into cash substitutes. The Federal Reserve intervened in the MMMF
market when the Reserve Primary Fund reduced its net asset value below $1 (“breaking the
buck”) due to investments in toxic asset backed commercial paper, precipitating in a run on the
MMMF industry see Paulson, supra note 118 at 234; Swagel, supra note 118 at 112–13; Swagel,
supra note 118 at 40–41; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (Univ. Chi. Press, 2016), 96–101; government intervention was also needed in liquidity
transformation in credit ETFs during the aforementioned Federal Reserve intervention in credit
markets, Greifeld & Kawa, supra note 120; Riquier, supra note 106.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\19-1\DPB101.txt

40

unknown

Seq: 40

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

20-AUG-21

11:14

[Vol. 19:1

class, the more likely a future problem can emerge,267 especially if the
resulting financial product is considered highly liquid (even cash substitutable).268 Additionally, liquidity mismatch creates misaligned incentives and conflicts for ETF authorized participants who also profit
from dealer activity in the underlying bond market.269
C. Private Equity’s Opaque (and Moving) Value Proposition
The net societal long-term value proposition of LBOs is unclear.
There is contested and varied evidence that these takeover structures
lead to lower worker wages and job loss,270 decreased corporate investment,271 and higher risk of bankruptcy for firms who must now
operate under the stranglehold of an unforgivingly leveraged balance
sheet.272 Perhaps the strongest accusation against PE, aligned with
the thesis of this article, is that it creates an incentive for wealth extraction rather than creation if wages can be reduced (with cost savings transferred to PE investors) under economic efficiency arguments
that the marginal product of the employee labor is less than its cost.273
An unsettling and recurrent concern is transparency in PE firm’s
“apparently seductive” returns, which aren’t subject to the same disclosure standards as mutual funds or ETFs, despite being frequently
267. See Martin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Pro.ved Risky: Commercial Paper
during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24(1) J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29, 34–37 (2010).
268. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 195-96
(N.Y.C.: Broadway Books, 2014), (stating that “[m]oney market funds were widely viewed as
virtually indistinguishable from bank deposits as similarly safe vehicles for storing cash with
slightly better interest rates”).
269. See Kevin Pan & Yao Zeng, ETF Arbitrage Under Liquidity Mismatch 2, EUROPEAN
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD WORKING PAPER NO. 59 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3723406
270. See Steven J. Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Ben Lipsius, Josher Lerner &
Javier Miranda, The Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts, BECKER FRIEDMAN INSTITUTE
WORKING PAPER NO. 2019-122 (Oct. 2019), available at https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/
uploads/BFI_WP_2019122.pdf; Also, compare E. APPLEBAUM & R. BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT
WORK (2014); Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, Private Equity Firms Have Caused Painful Job
Losses and More Are Coming, FORBES (October 30, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/10/30/private-equity-firms-have-caused-painful-job-losses-andmore-are-coming/?sh=77e8a7e67bff [all contending that PE firms fragilize wage stability and
lead to net job loss while enriching the profits and payouts of PE firms] with EY, Economic
Contribution of the US Private Equity Sector in 2018, REP. PREPARED AMN INVMENT Council
(Oct. 2019); Kevin Amess, Souragel Girma & Mike Write, The Wage and Employment Consequences of Ownership Change, 35(2) MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS 161 (2014) [citing the positive impact of private equity on wages and job growth]
271. Everything is Private Equity Now, supra note 90.
272. See Brian Ayash & Mahdi Rastad, Leveraged Buyouts and Financial Distress, UNPUBLISHED WORKING PAPER (July 20, 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423290
273. See A. Shleifer & L.H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, A. Auerbach (eds.) (Aug. 1987).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\19-1\DPB101.txt

2020-21]

unknown

MISALIGNED INCENTIVES

Seq: 41

IN

20-AUG-21

MARKETS

11:14

41

purchased by large pension funds.274 There is also empirical evidence
that, over the last twenty years, PE firms haven’t outperformed comparatively “cheap” passive index funds, and that private equity returns
are comparable to public company equities.275 Accusations have also
been levied that PE returns are not only “hard to measure” but that
they can be overstated (using a variety of discretionary valuation measures), hide true volatility (since portfolio companies aren’t publicly
traded), and that returns can be “gamed” by timing when investor
capital is deployed.276
D. The Shared Costs of Securities Price Distortions
Market euphoria, like that exhibited in the recent meme stock saga
for walking dead companies like BlackBerry, AMC and the aforementioned brick and mortar GameStop video game distributor, wasn’t
motivated by a “belief in that firm’s growth potential” but was rather
powered by an incentive to drive losses for hedge funds, or ride a
wave to a short term speculative payoff.277 The reality of fintech and
democratized market access is that this type of fundamentally dislocated market behavior is likely here to stay, and with that most of
society - other than firms who benefit from increased market volatility
like those described above,278 and a few one off Reddit legends like
“Roaring Kitty”279 - are actually much worse off in a market where
prices don’t reflect economic realities of companies, or the true underlying value of assets.
Professor Jay Cullen has argued that a “qualitative” technological
shift has taken place in market infrastructure, led by the nascent dominance of ETFs as trading vehicles and algorithmic, automated trading
mechanisms; and while trading is now faster and occurs at higher
274. See Ford, supra note 127 (noting the potential for investor confusion when private equity
(PE) firms cite internal rate of return (IRR) in their marketing efforts, which could be misleading as it failed to disclose the cash return schedule, assumes that cash returned to investors can
then reinvested at the stated IRR, and it fails to deduct from the IRR the PE firm’s large fees
which can often be as high as 7 percent).
275. See Alexander Beath & Christopher Flynn, Benchmarking the Performance of Private
Equity Portfolios of the World’s Largest Institutional Investors: A View from CEM Benchmarking, 30(1) THE JOURNAL OF INVESTING 67 (2020); Chris Flood, Cheap tracker funds trounce
private equity, FINANCIAL TIMES (December 12, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/0640d664083e-4439-8fe4-faa06eee6e17;
276. See Everything is Private Equity Now, supra note 90.
277. See Soloman, supra note 218.
278. See supra Section III(i).
279. See Nathaniel Popper and Kellen Browning, The ‘Roaring Kitty’ rally: How a Reddit
user and his friends roiled the markets, CHICAGO TRIBUTE (January 29, 2021), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-nyt-reddit-user-roiled-markets-20210129-onigxuxctnhw7adjsbmhn2udnq-story.html.
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volumes, the “role of information” has also changed where investors
now look to the actions of a small group of influential actors rather
than making investment decisions in accordance with their own research.280 This increases the potential for investor herding, disincentivizes active price discovery, allows for both “free-riding” and “frontrunning” by algo-traders, and “crowds” out the real information signals of informed investors.281
Early in March 2020, as the market moved to price in the full impact of the coronavirus pandemic, Robin Wigglesworth of the Financial Times argued that the contextual events were actually indicative
of a larger evolution – where markets were now “shock led” and
characterized by “stronger, longer booms and grim but rapid
busts.”282 The drivers of this evolution as suggested by Wigglesworth,283 are very much related to Minsky’s MMC and the thesis of
this paper – that the behaviors of profit seeking intermediaries create
externalities detached from the capital needs of productive enterprises
or the “process of creative destruction” inherent in entrepreneurial
pursuits.284 Specifically, Wigglesworth cited the increased use of option writing by traders and financial firms to increase returns,285 the
increasingly common use of “value-at-risk”286 in portfolio composition decisions made by institutional money managers (which can facilitate pro-cyclical selling momentum), the nascent growth of “volatility
targeting” funds, and liquidity pull-back from high frequency trading
algorithms.287 Others support a similar assertion that the current volatile state of the market is a “byproduct” of its modern architecture –
280. Jay Cullen, Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFS) and FINTECH: Market Efficiency and Systemic Risk, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
OSLO FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2020-33 (October 13, 2020), at 2, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3710610.
281. Id.
282. See Robin Wigglesworth, Coronavirus mayhem reflects phenomenon of ‘shock-led’ markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 6, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f25dbda0-5ecf-11ea-b0ab339c2307bcd4 (support for this assertion was the increasing occurrence of the “ratio of five-day
volatility to three-month volatility.”)
283. Id.
284. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1950), 81-87.
285. See Wigglesworth, supra note 281. (“option “writing” means that a trader sells an option
- the right to buy or sell an underlying asset. By selling the option the trader obtains an immediate premium payment, and thus has increased their portfolio returns; however, in volatile times
the writer of the option may resort to asset fire sales, or additional derivatives selling, to cover
their loss exposure.”).
286. Id.; see Will Kenton, Value at Risk (VaR), INVESTOPEDIA (April 18, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/v/var.asp (“Value at risk (VaR) is a statistic that measures and
quantifies the level of financial risk within a firm, portfolio or position over a specific time
frame.”)
287. See Wigglesworth, supra note 281.
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and that asset price distortion is occurring from the gigantic success of
passive investing, and “synthetic attempts to generate yield by systemically selling volatility.”288
Programmatic trading and volatility targeting are incentivized in
our modern financial system, and there is very little evidence that either of these activities contribute to creative or productive enterprise
(or lead to job creation, other than for those working at a few financial firms). Trading today is dominated by “trend” strategies, where
buying or selling decisions are “driven by algorithmic or programmatic trading systems”, which increase market volatility.289 Even index funds, which have grown tremendously in popularly, are a
“momentum” strategy because underlying securities are bought or
sold programmatically based on the decision to buy or sell the index.290 Our modern financial system allows intermediaries to extract
profits, while sharing the externalities of price inefficiency, and increased system volatility with all. Each time an index fund is purchased, a corresponding underlying basket of individual securities
must be acquired.291 Yet the desire to own a fund is unrelated to the
idiosyncratic attributes of individual securities within that fund, or a
desire to purchase one of the underlying securities because of its perceived fundamental value.292
As a result, the entire fund industry adds a layer of activity to the
financial market ecosystem entirely detached from a desire to buy (or
sell) the individual underlying security based on an assessment of that
company’s merit.293 In other words, passive investing is undermining
active price discovery, and given the unprecedented success and scale
of passive investing we can’t be certain that prices accurately reflect
true information about a company.294 Passive investing has also been
associated with a spectrum of phenomena suggesting an inefficient
288. See LOGICA CAPITAL ADVISERS, LLC, Policy in a World of Pandemics, Social Media and
Passive Investing (March 26, 2020), https://www.logicafunds.com/policy-in-a-world-of-pandemics.
289. David Thomas, A Warning From The Late John Bogle, FORBES (February 12, 2019).
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/12/a-warning-from-the-late-john-bogle/
?sh=1ec58d962b99
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Lawrence R. Glosten et al., ETF Activity and Informational Efficiency of Underlying
Securities, COLUMBIA BUS. SCH., RESEARCH PAPER NO. 16-71, (2019), 15–16 available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2846157; Reed Stevenson, The Big Short’s Michael Burry Explains Why Index
Funds Are Like Subprime CDOs, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 4, 2019, 5:41 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/michael-burry-explains-why-indexfunds-are-likesubprime-.
293. See Yun Li, 80 % of the Stock Market is Now on Autopilot, CNBC (June 29, 2019, 8:30
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/28/80percent-of-the-stock-market-is-now-onautopilot.html
294. See Sushko & Turner, supra note 62 at 113-114, 129.
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market - including trading price correlations in securities,295 and momentum outperforming value stocks.296 Volatility and price uncertainty will always exist, even in a healthy capitalistic system, because
as noted by Minsky, “[u]ncertainty (or unsureness) is a deep property
of decentralized systems in which a myriad of independent agents
made decisions whose impacts are aggregated into outcomes that
emerge over a range of tomorrows.”297 Yet, our evolved MMC financial system creates uncertainty in a destructive way, unrelated to –
even undermining - capitalism’s price discovery and information aggregation function.
There is a strong argument to be made that modern MMC is homogenizing the financial market – as more and more investors hold
passive investments and increasingly correlated portfolios.298 Institutional investors, and other money managers, also are converging on
correlated risk management models given the nascent market dominance of BlackRock’s Aladdin software299 As Andrew Haldane has
pointed out homogenized financial systems are unpredictable in a crisis, and as with all complex systems, diversity helps to strengthen sys295. See Logica Capital Advisers, supra note 287; see Pagano, Serrano & Zechner, supra note
104 at 3, 8 Thomas Stratmann & John W. Welborn, Exchange-Traded Funds, Fails-To Deliver,
and Market Volatility, GEORGE MASON UNIV. DEP’T OF ECON., WORKING PAPER NO. 12-59
(2012), at 43, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183251; See Zhi Da & Sophie Shive, Exchange Traded Funds and Asset Return Correlations, 24 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 136, 152 (2018); see
Markus Leippold et al., How Index Futures and ETFs Affect Stock Return Correlations, Unpublished manuscript (Apr. 24, 2016) at 28, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2620955.
296. See Logica Capital Advisers, supra note 287.
297. See Minsky, supra note 1 at 360.
298. The factors driving “correlated portfolios” and common exposures amongst investors are
varied and include correlation in the trading strategies of high frequency and algorithmic traders,
see A.P. Chaboud, B. Chiquoine, E. Hjalmarsson & C. Vega, Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic
Trading In The Foreign Exchange Market, 69 J. FINANCE 2045 (2014); correlated holdings given
the dominance of passive index structures and common intermediated shareholding asset managers , see Clements, Are ETFs, supra note 48 at 794-809, see Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-To-Fail
Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587, 592-593, 633-636 (2018); Pagano, Serrano & Zechner,
supra note 104 at 3, 18. Correlation is also occurring from common strategies utilized and followed by “robo-advisors” and other forms of automated wealth management platforms that use
ETFs in model portfolios, see James Rickards, Robot Trading Will End in Disaster, DAILY RECKONING (July 19, 2019), https://dailyreckoning.com/robot-trading-will-end-in-disaster/; correlated
strategies exhibited in the market-making functions of liquidity providers that trade in ETFs, see
Thomas Stratmann & John W. Welborn, Exchange-Traded Funds, Fails To Deliver, and Market
Volatility, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WORKING PAPER NO.
12-59 (2012), at 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183251.
299. See Will Dunn, Meet Aladdin, The Computer “More Powerful Than Traditional Politics”
NEWSTATESMAN AMERICA (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.newstatesman.com/spotlight/2018/04/
meet-aladdin-computer-more-powerful-traditional-politics; Lawrence White, HSBC signs deal to
use BlackRock’s ‘Aladdin’ software worldwide, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-blackrock/hsbc-signs-deal-to-use-blackrocks-aladdin-softwareworldwide-idUSKCN1R21NO
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tem “durability.”300 Homogenization, heightened volatility, and a
decrease in the informational value of securities, highlights the emerging “tragedy of the commons” problem in our evolved MMC financial
structure with individual benefits and shared costs.301
E. Increasing System Complexity but Not Productivity
Economist Roger Bootle argues that all profits in a capitalistic system emanate from either a “creative” or a “distributive” activity of a
firm.302 He posits that the operations of all profit seeking enterprises
exist on a spectrum between creative and distributive,303 and that
firms (and individuals) often engage in both types of activities, but
that the most successful societies are those that “maximize” their capacity for creative enterprise (with profits derived from creative endeavors), while seeking to minimize distributive profits.304 Much of
the intermediation that takes place in financial markets today yields
“distributive” profits to intermediating firms.305 Bootle refers to distributive profit seeking as a “zero-sum game” since it produces a winner at the expense of a loser, and suggests that such behavior is
endemic in financial markets.306 In addition to these tremendous distributive gains, financial intermediaries have arguably overtaken the
sovereign in determining the size of the credit supply.307 As a result,
Professors Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova note that private
credit generation is “misallocated” away from productive uses and
“continuously re-absorbed” through financial firms.308
High-frequency, and algorithmic trading, is making markets more
prone to model risk, extreme movements and heightened volatility.309
Today’s markets are increasingly “shock-led,” characterized by more
intense booms, and “more violent” shocks.310 The factors that contribute to this new reality – such as the increased use of option writing
300. See Andrew G. Haldane, Rethinking the Financial Network, Speech at Financial Student
Association, Amsterdam (April 28, 2009), 3-4, 9-10, available at https://www.bis.org/review/
r090505e.pdf.
301. See de Aenlle, supra note 65.
302. See Bootle, supra note 131 at 84.
303. Id. at 116.
304. Id. at 84.
305. Id. at 98, 102.
306. Id. at 102, 104-107.
307. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 234 at 1214.
308. Id. at 1213-1214.
309. Doug Kass, Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Increasing, REAL MONEY (February 23, 2019), https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/kass-financial-weapons-ofmass-destruction-are-increasing-14875209.
310. See Wigglesworth, supra note 281.
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strategies, value-at-risk market exposure adjustments, and volatility
“targeting”311 – originate entirely from the profit seeking enterprises
of market intermediaries, untethered from the actual capital needs of
productive enterprises. Extreme price volatility like that exhibited in
the GameStop saga (potentially manufactured by manipulating market actors) creates many enforcement challenges for financial markets
regulators, especially when allegations of market manipulation are
generated on anonymous forums like Reddit.312 Such an undertaking
exhausts regulatory capital in a challenging cat and mouse chase,313
yet it is all entirely detached from production. One wonders if this is
the inevitable path of regulatory resources – chasing bad actors in an
increasingly complex and opaque game significantly detached from
economic utility or new productive enterprise.
Modern evolved MMC allows intermediaries to profit by increasing
financial system complexity detached from productivity. Minsky argued that in his time “institutional complexity” was being increased by
“several layers of intermediation.”314 Now the intermediation layers
are even further obscured by information tracing nightmares and tremendous interpretive difficulties in sorting forum chatter from legally
defined market manipulation and fraud.315 Yet as the market complexifies, numerous empirical studies cite no observable correlation
(or even worse, a possible inverse relationship) between financial industry growth and economic productivity.316
Also, an increasing number of post-2008 crisis financial product innovations, including those linked to the CBOE Volatility Index
311. Id.
312. See Aaron Keller, SEC Will Struggle To Build Market Manipulation Case After Massive
GameStop Stock Rally: Securities Law Prof., LAW & CRIME (January 30, 2020), https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/sec-will-struggle-to-build-market-manipulation-case-after-massivegamestop-stock-rally-securities-law-prof/.
313. See Soloman, supra note 218.
314. See Minsky, Financial Instability, supra note 20 at 4.
315. See Keller, supra note 311.
316. See Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef. An International Look at the Growth of Modern
Finance, 27(2) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 73 (2013); Ratna Sahay et al. Rethinking
Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets, IMF Staff Discussion Note, 6
(May 2015); Stephen G. Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing The Impact of Finance on
Growth, BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPERS NO. 381 (July 17, 2012),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work381.htm; Stephen G Cecchetti, & Enisse Kharroubi. Why Does Financial Sector Growth Crowd Out Real Economic Growth? BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPERS NO. 490 (February 2015); See Owen Woolcock, Is Finance An
Unproductive Industry, FINANCIAL TIMES (February 6, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/
c8c98627-4992-361b-916f-6a2b4fd4e776; Eckhard Hein, Finance-Dominated Capitalism and Redistribution of Income: A Kaleckian Perspective, LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE, WORKING PAPER
NO. 746 (January 10, 2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198919.
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(VIX),317 have no productive underlying economic value at all.318
Others use leverage or derivatives to create inverse or multiple returns.319 Financial innovation facilitates a constant “synthesis” of economic interests and “scaling up” in transaction speed and volume.320
These instruments do not create jobs, or increase societal economic
welfare, but destabilize the system by increasing volatility through directional bets, asymmetrical payoffs and enhanced speculative trading.321 In early February 2018, major U.S. equity indices dropped
more than 5 percent, as the market reeled with tremendous volatility.322 In a single day the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) (an algorithmic indicator of market volatility also known as the “fear”
gauge) jumped over 116 percent,323 matching volatility levels from the
1998 Russian Ruble crisis, the GFC and in 2011 when US credit was
downgraded by Standard and Poor’s from AAA to AA+.324 It was
later discovered that traders had been “shorting volatility” (by selling
futures contracts on the VIX), a trade that was profitable when the
VIX was below VIX futures price; however, when the VIX spiked,
traders had to quickly cover their positions at a loss.325 The spike in
the VIX crushed several structured “inverse VIX” exchange-traded
products, some of which had to be terminated.326
317. See Ryan Clements, If We Can, Does It Mean That We Should? Volatility Linked ETPs
and The Recent Crash, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
CENTER, FINANCIAL REGULATION BLOG (February 10, 2018), https://sites.law.duke.edu/
thefinregblog/2018/02/10/if-we-can-does-it-mean-that-we-should-volatility-linked-etps-and-therecent-crash/.
318. Costas Lapavitsas, The Government Isn’t To Blame For The Rise of Wall Street, THE
WASHINGTON POST (April 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/
04/19/the-government-isnt-to-blame-for-the-rise-of-wall-street/?utm_term=.1ef98b15ff76.
319. See Kate Stalter, Why That Leveraged ETF Is A Bad Idea, FORBES (January 23, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/katestalter/2017/01/23/why-that-leveraged-etf-is-a-bad-idea/
#22b6619f6ed2.
320. See Omarova, supra note 70 at 762-766 (Omarova suggests this occurs through a constant
process of pooling, layering, acceleration, and compression of economic interests into digitally
represented financial products).
321. See Rachel Evans, & Carolina Wilson, Is This The Markets Latest Problem Child?
BLOOMBERG (February 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-08/spotlightturns-to-etf-problem-children-after-volatility-blow-up.
322. Jeff Cox, Why The Market Is So Volatile Right Now, CNBC February 6, 2018), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/why-the-market-sell-off-just-keeps-going.html.
323. See Nathan Bomey, Fears of Market Volatility Swell as Stocks Plunge, USA TODAY (February 6, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/02/06/fears-market-volatility-swellstocks-plunge/310264002/.
324. See Jim Edwards, VIX: The ‘fear index’ has only been this high on 3 prior occasions,
BUSINESS INSIDER (February 6, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/vix-fear-index-volatility2018-2.
325. Id.
326. See Joanna Ossinger, VIX-Related ETPs Go Wild In After-Hours Trading Route,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS (February 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
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In the wake of the shuttering of several inverse VIX products, with
hundreds of millions of dollars wiped out in days, many questioned
the productive utility of these products327 – including the creator of
the VIX Devash Shah.328 The issue here isn’t disclosure – the products
were compliant with securities disclosure rules.329 However, embedding opaquely worded risks in a mountain of disclosures and qualifications doesn’t magically create economic utility or productive value.
Products like inverse VIX funds motivate pure zero-sum speculation –
gambling at best.330 Yet in modern MMC, market intermediaries have
misaligned incentives to proliferate complex financial products if a
speculative buyer can be found. The fact that gamblers exist is unremarkable. But when gambling undermines economic stability because of the increased interconnectedness and complexity of the
financial system,331 when market gyrations give rise to unpredictable
05/vix-related-etps-go-wild-in-after-hours-trading-in-wake-of-rout; Thomas Franck, Credit Suisse
says it will end trading in the volatility security that’s become the focus of this sell off, CNBC
(February 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/the-obscure-volatility-security-thats-become-the-focus-of-this-sell-off-is-halted-after-an-80-percent-plunge.html; Michael Shields &
Trevor Hunnicutt, Credit Suisse ‘volatility’ fund liquidated after market selloff, REUTERS (February 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-credit-suisse-gp-notes/credit-suisse-volatilityfund-liquidated-after-market-selloff-idUSKBN1FQ256.
327. Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Cramer: A little-known security tied to a calm market became a
‘toxic cigarette’ for this sell off, CNBC (February 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/
cramer-xiv-note-proved-to-be-a-toxic-cigarette-for-the-market.html; Elizabeth Gurdus, Cramer
rails against VIX trading products: They are ‘practically designed to fail’, CNBC (February 7,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/cramer-vix-trading-products-are-practically-designed-tofail.html;
328. Max Abelson & Joe Weisenthal, An Inventor of the VIX: ‘I Don’t Know Why These
Products Exist’, BLOOMBERG (February 6, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-02-06/an-inventor-of-the-vix-i-don-t-know-why-these-products-exist
329. Natasha Turak, Credit Suisse Defends Controversial Financial Product At The Center Of
The Market Turmoil, CNBC (February 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/credit-suissedefends-controversial-xiv-etn-amid-market-turmoil.html.
330. Doug Kass, Kill The Quants (and Levered ETFs and ETNs) Before They Kill Our Market, REAL MONEY (February 6, 2018), https://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/02/06/2018/killquants-and-levered-etfs-and-etns-they-kill-our-market.
331. Several academic studies have noted the relationship between financial system complexity and increased systemic risk. See Stefano Battiston, Guido Caldarelli, Robert M. May, Tarik
Roukny, & Joseph Stiglitz, The Price Of Complexity In Financial Markets, 113(36) PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PNAS 10031,
10031-10036 (September 2016), available at https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1521573113; see Kathryn
Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64
STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 211 (2009); Alex J. Pollock, Financial Markets and “System Effects”: Complexity, Recursiveness, Uncertainty and Mistakes in Finance, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
WORKING PAPER (July 24, 2012), http://www.aei.org/publication/financial-markets-and-systemeffects-complexity-recursiveness-uncertainty-and-mistakes-in-finance/; Christian Koehler, The
Relationship between the Complexity of Financial Derivatives and Systemic Risk, SSRN (May 31,
2011), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2511541.
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events and non-linear consequences, and crises exacerbated by automated and programmatic trading,332 perhaps we should give pause
and assess why the system has evolved to be this way, what misaligned
incentives drive this evolved system,333 and how it might be improved.
F. Why More Isn’t Necessarily Better in Financial Products
Curbing the misaligned incentives evident in market intermediation
implies a simplified financial system – some may consider this
unimaginable given the current system’s trajectory for increased complexity. Nassim Nicholas Taleb suggested that the “problem of the
commercial world is that it only works by addition (via positiva), not
subtraction (via negative)”334 – and this is particularly true for the financial system. Yet continual additions in the form of increased product supply, and layered intermediation, do not make the system
better, safer, or more productive – it represents an asymmetrical value
extraction for market intermediaries who can profit “from” the complexity of the system.335
Researchers at the University of Arizona have shown that “substantial” investment allocations in U.S. equity ETFs (from both retail and
institutional investors) flow to new funds with higher fees and lower
liquidity, leading to significant excess aggregate costs for investors.336
One notable post-2008 crisis trend is the proliferation of “thematic”
ETFs which cater to a wide range of “specialist investment interests”
with increasing allocations to ESG (environmental, social and governance) themed funds like renewable energy, as well as social justice
332. See Steven Pearlstein, The robots vs. robots trading that has hijacked the stock market,
THE WASHINGTON POST (February 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2018/02/07/the-robots-v-robots-trading-that-has-hijacked-the-stock-market/?utm_
term=.9a0b677ad4ee.
333. See Matthew J. Belvedere, Icahn: The Market Will One Day ‘Implode” Because Of These
Wacky Funds Using So Much Leverage, CNBC (February 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
02/06/billionaire-investor-carl-icahn-there-are-too-many-derivatives-and-the-current-market-isa-rumbling-warning.html.
334. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain From Disorder, 400 (1st ed. 2014)
335. Scholars have gone as far as to label the profit seeking activities of market intermediaries
as creating “multiple methods for extraction of value by the financial sector that must be paid for
by the productive economy” see Wallace Turbeville, A New Perspective On The Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation: Inefficiency Of Capital Intermediation In A Deregulated System, 72
Md. L. Rev. 1173, 1203 (2013).
336. See David C. Brown, Scott Cederburg & Mitch Towner, (Sub)Optimal Asset Allocation
to ETFs, Working Paper (September 17, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3694592
(the authors suggest that the “aggregate costs” from allocations to high cost, low liquidity ETFs
are between $1.1 billion and $17.5 billion since 2000).
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themes like “gender equality.”337 Yet empirical research has shown
that these funds consistently underperform market returns.338 In a recent study, this author has shown that the proliferation of ETF forms
has led to endemic investor confusion due to, among other factors,
discretion in index replication, custom and bespoke index creation,
tracking errors, variable financial, operational and management practices of ETF issuers including variability in the calculation methods of
key performance variables, diverse securities lending practices, a lack
of naming conventions, and an ineffective securities disclosure regime
given advancements in our understanding of behavioral finance
principles.339
G. The Unique Shard Costs of Exchange Traded Funds
The uber-popular ETF presents unique shared costs in an intermediated financial market, not otherwise present in other managed funds
including fragilities derived from instability in the arbitrage function,340 and the attraction of noise traders attracted to ETF liquidity.341 There are other unique potential risks, and fragilities, in ETFs
that are shared by the entire market. Recent research has revealed
that ETFs “amplify market movements during periods of stress and
uncertainty” due to “feedback” effects between ETF market and underlying asset market trading activity.342 The existence of “feedback
trading” effects potentially impair conventional trading halt mechanisms (the so-called system “circuit breakers” in the financial system)
and may increase “end of day volatility” due to the rebalancing activities of ETF funds.343
ETFs also create unique “concentration risks” since they are highly
reliant on APs and other market makers arbitraging price differences
between the ETF secondary market price and the value of the fund’s
337. See Emma Boyde, Thematic ETFs can delivery significant losses, academics find, Financial Times (January 25, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7e16172e-ce51-4c41-a1393a796790bbbe?shareType=nongift.
338. See Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco A. Franzoni, Byungwook Kim, & Rabih Moussawi,
Competition for Attention in the ETF Space, NBER Working Paper No. w28369 (January 27,
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3772608.
339. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48.
340. See Clements, Are ETFs, supra note 48 at 812-814; supra Sections III(a) & IV(b).
341. See Pagano, Serrano & Zechner, supra note 104 at 2–3, 8 (“[T]here is evidence that ETFs
are associated with increased price volatility of the constituent securities: the high liquidity and
continuous trading of ETFs enable investors, including noise traders, to take large short-term
directional positions on entire asset baskets.”).
342. See Ayan Bhattachaya & Maureen O’Hara, ETFs and Systemic Risks, CFA INSTITUTE
RESEARCH FOUNDATION BRIEF (January 2020) at 13, available at https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/
media/documents/article/rf-brief/etfs-and-systemic-risks.ashx
343. Id. at 13-14.
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underlying assets, and there is increasing consolidation in the market
for these vital intermediaries.344 ETFs also increase the potential for
investor herds since the “systemic factor signal” (the non-idiosyncratic
component of risk that is present in all portfolios) serves as a “coordinating” device in index products.345 The fact that ETFs were trader’s
“tool of choice” in the coronavirus sell-off in March 2020 strengthens
the contention that they are herd coordination mechanisms.346
H. Are Asset Managers Becoming Too “Influential” To Fail?
An unintended byproduct of the passive investment revolution is a
tremendous concentration of economic power in the hands of megaasset managers.347 The proxy voting influence of the world’s largest
asset managers, combined with their increasingly large creditor positions through direct loan portfolios, also give these financial firms
“powerful levers” over the economy, and significant influence on government stability measures.348 The larger, more influential, and more
interconnected that asset managers grow, the more that global governments will rely on them for expertise in a crisis. The Federal Reserve had to rely on BlackRock who, aided by its behemoth risk
management program, Aladdin, has a much greater expertise in evaluating, pricing and managing debt than the central bank itself.349 The
Fed’s reliance on BlackRock, along with the firm’s recently procured
contract to advise the European Commission (EC) on sustainability
rules has “helped cement” the policymaking role of the world’s largest
asset manager with global regulators.350 This influence was intentionally sought out by BlackRock. The Financial Times recently reported
that between 2014 and 2020 BlackRock met with 31 different EC officials in private meetings and roundtables, and increased their Euro344. Matteo Aquilina, Karen Croxson, Gian Giacomo Valentini & Lachlan Vass, Fixed Income ETFs: Primary Market Participation and Resilience of Liquidity During Periods of Stress,
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, RESEARCH NOTE (Aug. 2019), at 4, available at https://
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/fixed-income-etfs-primary-market-participation-resilienceliquidity-during-periods-stress.pdf (“There is a high level of concentration among APs. The 5
most active APs are responsible for about 75% of overall reported primary market volumes
(across all asset classes). Concentration is particularly pronounced in the fixed income market,
with the top 5 APs there accounting for around 91% of overall volumes and the top AP itself
accounting for 51%”).
345. See Bhattachaya & O’Hara, supra note 341 at 6.
346. See Dawn Lim & Mischa Frankl-Duval, supra note 222; see Clements supra note 112.
347. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 59.
348. See Lim and Zuckerman, supra note 146.
349. See Massa, supra note 148.
350. See Siobhan Riding, EU lobbying by fund groups fuel fears over vested interest, FINANCIAL
TIMES (January 3, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/298e8544-5b53-44fd-925c89b64ce0da37.
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pean Union lobbying spending over 300 percent between 2012 and
2019.351 Lobbying directly benefits asset managers through advisory
contracts, but more importantly it provides indirect benefits through
the implementation of favorable rules (often via small adjustments
that add up over time), where the asset manager’s technical expertise
“is not always neutral.”352
One of the most consequential, yet lightly discussed developments
in market intermediation is the emergence of platform technologies
that act as infrastructure services, and create dependencies and interconnections amongst market participants as a financial utility.353
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, also owns Aladdin, the
largest risk management and end to end portfolio management platform in the world,354 which drives investment decisions for over $20
trillion of assets (an amount equivalent to “four times the value of all
cash in the world, the annual GDP of the U.S., or the total U.S. stock
market capitalization.”)355 The widespread use of Aladdin by market
participants, including some of the largest sovereign wealth funds on
the planet, gives rise to unprecedented correlation and investor herding risks, in addition to the tremendous influence, and importance as
an infrastructure provider of BlackRock.356 The influence of Aladdin
cannot be overstated as it is a key element in the government’s reliance on BlackRock in response to its corporate bond and credit ETF
buying program in the coronavirus pandemic.357
I. The Misaligned Incentives in Asset Manager Governance
Professors Ronald Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt, in a recent study,
argue that – similar to Minsky’s assertion involving financial markets
–corporate governance structures are being constantly reshaped,
driven by two dynamic factors, “capital market completeness” and
“policy channeling“ that continually vary in their relative influence on
the governance system.358 Importantly, for the purposes of this arti351. Id. (It was also reported that during the same period, the world’s second largest asset
manager, Vanguard correspondingly increased their lobbying spending by 400 percent).
352. Id.
353. See Zetzsche, Birdthistle, Arner, & Buckley, supra note 83.
354. See BLACKROCK, An end-to-end portfolio management platform, https://www.blackrock.
com/aladdin/offerings/aladdin-overview.
355. Id. at 14-16.
356. See Dunn, supra note 298.
357. Dawn Lim, Federal Reserve Taps BlackRock to Purchase Bonds for the Government, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-reserve-tapsblackrock-to-purchase-bonds-for-the-government-11585085843.
358. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Shifting Influences on Corporate Governance:
Capital Market Completeness and Policy Channeling, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN-
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cle, Gilson and Milhaupt posit that there is currently a shift away from
the discretion of corporate managers towards greater “policy channeling” as a result of the nascent dominance of institutional investors
who are steadily increasing their voting influence over portfolio companies as intermediated common owners, and that these influences
are leading to less complete markets.359 Even more concerning (and
in alignment with Minsky’s MMC), Professor Leo Strine recently suggested that our corporate governance system has evolved in a way that
is “fundamentally different” from how it was originally conceived
given today’s dominance of institutional shareholders.360 He posits
this regulatory dislocation is generating “suboptimal results” including
increased power for asset managers over portfolio companies (and by
implication the entire market) and less protections for stakeholders
(and society).361
One potential suboptimal result is in the “lending-voting” tradeoff
encountered by asset managers given their large, intermediated share
ownership concentration.362 Asset managers have financial incentives
to not vote shares at all, but rather lend them out at a profit.363 Securities lending has increased substantially in the U.S. since the 2008
global financial crisis,364 particularly by large ETF issuers like BlackRock.365 Securities lending was also a principle factor in the downfall
of AIG during the 2008 crisis.366 Recent research has revealed a “sub- LAW WORKING PAPER 546/2020, COLUMBIA LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER
NO. 634, STANFORD LAW AND ECONOMICS OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 557 (January 11, 2021).
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3695309 (in establishing their thesis the authors reject the
“single factor” model of corporate governance driven by overriding themes like “stakeholderism” or “shareholder value maximization” and rather adopt a binary model focusing on “capital
market completeness” and policy channeling.”)
359. Id.
360. See Leo Strine, Stewardship 2021: The Centrality of Institutional Investor Regulation to
Restoring a Fair and Sustainable American Economy, U OF PENN, INST FOR LAW & ECON RESEARCH PAPER NO. 20-55, COLUMBIA LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 633 (October
23, 2020). available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3719145.
361. Id.
362. Edwin Hu, Joshua Mitts & Haley Sylvester, The Index-Fund Dilemma: An Empirical
Study of the Lending-Voting Tradeoff, NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 20-52
December 22, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3673531.
363. Id.
364. See Tim McLaughlin & Ross Kerber, Securities Lending Boom Sparks Concerns on Returns and Voting, REUTERS (November 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-lending-analysis/securities-lending-boom-sparks-concerns-on-returns-and-voting-idUSKCN1ND0JA;
Jessica Tasman-Jones, SJP Securities Lending More Than Doubles at Blackrock, PORTFOLIO ADVISER (August 14, 2019), https://portfolio-adviser.com/sjp-securities-lending-more-than-doublesat-blackrock/.
365. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48 at 23-25.
366. Robert McDonald & Anna Paulson, AIG in Hindsight, 29(2) J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES
81, 81-95 (2015).
STITUTE
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stantial increase” in the extent that institutional shareholders lend
their shares rather than vote them, and that shares with “high index
ownership” see a “marked increase” in shares that are lent right
before shareholder meetings.367
V.

THREE FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS

A. The Power and Influence of Market Intermediaries
Market intermediaries, as a collective group, sit as complex interconnectors between productive firms, retail and institutional investors,
and universal banks.368 The three largest asset managers (BlackRock,
Vanguard and State Street) respectively control through intermediated
holdings over $19 trillion in assets – roughly equivalent to 10% of the
value of the entire world’s quoted securities market.369 As noted, PE
firms also continue to expand into nearly all segments of the economic
system.370 The growing influence of market intermediaries is astounding, especially concerning the fact that many stockholders don’t vote
their shares.371 Also these firms operate with huge economies of
scale,372 and given their fee structure they have very little incentive to
encourage competition amongst their portfolio companies.373 Unfortunately, the challenge in responding to the concerns generated by
these investment leviathans may have been best described recently by
the Financial Times, “[c]ompared with Big Tech, the issues raised by
Big Passive are so far too technical and low profile to spur regulatory
action.”374
The linked interdependencies persuasively highlighted by Professor
Wilmarth’s “global doom loop,”375 are made even more unstable by
market intermediary’s perpetual foray into cash markets as shadow
banks.376 The problem with the creation and distribution of cash-substitutable or other near-cash financial products, outside of regulated
banks, is that they create a “dangerous” illusion of being a “safe” or
367. Hu, Mitts & Sylvester, supra note 361.
368. See Clements, Are ETFs, supra note 48 at 786-809.
369. See FINANCIAL TIMES, Opinion Lex, BlackRock / Vanguard: ETF Leviathans (January
18, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/983542f1-151d-4fae-947a-6509967183aa.
370. See supra Sections II(f), III(b) & IV(c)
371. See FINANCIAL TIMES, supra note 60.
372. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 59.
373. See FINANCIAL TIMES, supra note 60.
374. Id.
375. See supra Section IV(a).
376. Id.
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“risk-free” asset.377 As Professors Anna Gelpern and Erik Gerding
persuasively contend, supposedly “safe assets” including government
bonds, deposits and short term asset backed securities facilitate a “distortion” given the “legal architecture” and “political commitments”
that are entrenched in these products.378 Pooling short-term securities
and government loans, and issuing them under the operating mechanics of an ETF, doesn’t change Gelpern and Gerding’s overarching insight – potential sovereign intervention is both implied, and necessary,
for a cash-substitutable product’s ongoing stability.379 Allowing cashsubstitutable, or near-cash analogous financial products, comprised of
pooled credit instruments, to operate within the shadow banking perimeter creates a “social cost” of liquidity transformation, since government support is necessary to support this market in a crisis without
the application on shadow banks of bank-like regulatory parameters,
transparency measures, and prudential safeguards.380 Money market
mutual funds (MMMF) have long operated as a “shadow deposit,”381
and required government intervention to stave a deeper panic sell-off
in the GFC when the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck” and
reduced its NAV below $1 per share.382
The continuing evolution of financial markets dominated by market
intermediaries with increasing size, power, influence, and interconnectivity is neither inevitable nor desirable. As the recent GameStop
saga has shown, an economic and financial system based on “asset
inflation” and dependent on the capricious gyrations, and mania
driven volatility of the stock market is not in the best interests of the
wider polity.383 The idea that fintech stock-trading apps are “democratizing” markets, or leading to a “more inclusive capitalism” is a fal377. See Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 363.
(2016). (Defining “safe assets” as a “catch-all term to describe financial contracts that market
participants treat as if they were risk free. These may include government debt, bank deposits,
and asset-backed securities, among others.”)
378. Id., see discussion at 406-411. The authors argue there is “no such thing as a risk-free
financial contract” and state intervention is a necessary pre-condition to these assets being supposedly “safe” (see at 365, 420).
379. See Clements, Are ETFs, supra note 48 at 839-840; see Section IV(b).
380. See Section IV(b); Clements, supra, Are ETFs, supra note 48 at 839; See Morgan Ricks,
Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. REV. 75, 78, 119-120 (2011).
381. See Geithner, supra note 267 at 195-96, (stating that “[m]oney market funds were widely
viewed as virtually indistinguishable from insured bank deposits, as similarly safe vehicles for
storing cash with slightly better interest rates”).
382. William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155,
1163, 1190; Paulson, supra note 118 at 233-34; McDonald & Paulson supra note 365 at 81-95.
383. See Rana Foroohar, The biggest lesson of Gamestop, FINANCIAL TIMES (February 7,
2021), https://www.ft.com/content/ca94c275-43aa-4d12-a0ff-868f2760c8b5.
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lacy,384 and the real benefactor (via distributive profits which
exacerbate income and wealth inequality) of meme stock pumps is
Wall Street.385 Meme stock pumps are nascent illustrations of a recurring financialization problem – the money in the financial system is
diverted away from productive uses to speculation.386 Commodity
price inflation from index speculation, the dot.com bubble, mortgage
backed securities and collateralized debt obligations are simply prior
iterations of financialization capital misallocation where subsequent
crashes wipe out billions.387
Real economic output, productivity, and the creation of innovations
that benefit society should be prioritized over trends that foster
greater economic and regulatory influence for market intermediaries.
This movement is gaining traction in the Biden administration as the
“great rebalancing,”388 and it aligns with Minsky’s own policy recommendations to move towards full employment with the government
even performing the role of an “employer of last resort.”389 There are
numerous regulatory adjustments that could shift the momentum
away from market intermediary growth, and each should be assessed
in more detail including, a return to a Glass-Steagall separation of
banking and investments;390 the imposition of non-bank systemically
important financial institution requirements on mega-asset managers,391 financial market utility requirements for digital platform mechanisms like BlackRock’s Aladdin,392 imposing a financial transactions
or “speculation” tax;393 and adjustments to proxy voting rules for intermediated asset managers.394
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id.
See Chung, supra note 214.
See Section III(i).
See Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 17 at 252.
See Rana Foroohar, Joe Biden and the ‘great rebalancing’ of the US economy, FINANCIAL
TIMES (January 24, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/6d19d4f2-78ce-4a3f-96c2-bc722daf2d63?
segmentID=B73b0b4c-e767-e669-4996-e25935a5759d.
389. See Wray, supra note 19 at 27, 34-36
390. See Wilmarth, supra note 240 at 335-356.
391. See Clements, Art ETFs, supra note 48 at 827-832.
392. See Chris Flood, BlackRock should split off its Aladdin tech platform, says think-tank,
Financial Times (November 24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/524a1fef-7bcd-4c2a-8e91a2e7124c13e3.
393. The idea of a financial transactions tax has been canvassed as far back as John Maynard
Keynes as a means of curbing the “casino” type behaviors of Wall Street participants and focusing their behaviors on activities with “social purpose.” See Greg Rosalsky, After GameStop, A
Better Way to Take on Wall Street, PLANET MONEY (February 9, 2021), https://www.npr.org/
sections/money/2021/02/09/965417988/after-gamestop-a-better-way-to-take-on-wall-street.
394. For a review of the various regulatory proposals in relation to intermediated common
ownership of market intermediaries, see Eric A. Posner, Policy Implications of the Common
Ownership Debate, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Re-
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B. The Transparency and Comparability of Investment Products
Given the pension exposure to PE funds, greater levels of transparency are necessary for investor protection.395 This becomes particularly relevant as evidence of PE outperformance relative to listed
equity becomes increasingly uncertain.396 Further, recent research has
shown that the “link between PE firms’ fundraising and performance
evaluation” is “susceptible to manipulation” since potential PE fund
limited partners have to rely on internally generated valuations when
evaluating fund performance.397 Increased transparency is also
needed for hedge funds, and reforms need to be made to allow for
easier investor comparisons in the uber popular ETFs. Increased
transparency in ETFs, through easier investor comparisons can curb
the proliferation of poor-quality products – many of which are overpriced, specialized, and compete for uninformed investors.398
It is not certain that the trend towards more financial products is
desirable.399 It’s possible that to improve investor transparency and
product comparability it may be necessary to ebb the proliferation of
new financial products. Ex-ante financial product licensing regimes of
various forms, in some cases similar to the regulation of new drugs,
have been advanced by diverse scholars including Professors Saule
Omarova,400 Eric Posner and Glenn Weyl,401 Robert Litan,402 and
search Paper No. 922 (October 31, 2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3722906.
395. See Ford, supra note 127.
396. See Flood, supra note 391.
397. See Ranko Jelic, Dan Zhou and Wasim Ahmad, Do Stressed PE Firms Misbehave? (November 19, 2020). JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE (forthcoming), available: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3744998.
398. See Ben-David, Franzoni, Kim, & Moussawi, supra, note 337.
399. James Lardner, Are we repeating history by letting our financial sector get too big? THE
WASHINGTON POST (April 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/
04/20/are-we-repeating-history-by-letting-our-financial-sector-grow-too-large/?utm_term
=.cd3c9e534f25.
400. See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. LAW. REV. 2, 76 (2012). (Suggesting a financial product-regulatory framework
that would “place the burden of proving social and economic utility of complex financial instruments on the intermediaries that structure and market them.”)
401. Eric A. Posner & Glen E. Weyl, A Proposal for Limiting Speculation on Derivatives: An
FDA for Financial Innovation. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR LAW & ECONOMICS
OLIN RESEARCH PAPER NO. 594 (January 29, 2012), at 13, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1995077 (advocating for an ex ante financial market product licensing regime (like the
U.S. Food & Drug Administration) and also indicating that new products should be required to
successfully navigate a “social utility” test which assesses whether a new financial product will be
used for hedging or speculation. Such a regime would effectively establish a form of the “insurable interest rule.“)
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Heather Hughes.403 An ex ante burden could be imposed to show
that a new financial product doesn’t increase systemic risk; alternatively a positive obligation could be placed on the issuer of a proposed
financial product to show cash flow implications from an investment
in an underlying productive venture, and include “regulatory followup” parameters since financial product innovations evolve in their use
propositions.404
In a recent study this author has also proposed a number of direct,
and immediate, “investor-focused” proposals for ETFs that would significantly increase transparency and aid in comparative efforts.405
These proposals include ETF issuers using standardized website layouts, strategic ordering and digital enhancements in their disclosure;406 uniform calculation methods for material ETF variables;407
naming conventions and standard terms for sustainable investing;408
and structured reporting to a centrally controlled but publicly accessible data repository.409
C. The Calculus of Financialization
It’s not certain that the continuing growth of the financial industry
relative to the real economy – commonly known as economic
“financialization”410 – marked by the rise of market intermediation, is
a net positive proposition for society. There are extensive criticisms of
“financialization” in the scholarly literature. It has been associated
with income inequality,411 economic “rent seeking,”412 declining pro402. See Robert E. Litan, In Defence of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE WHITE PAPER (Wednesday February 17, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
in-defense-of-much-but-not-all-financial-innovation/.
403. See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law,
20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 179 (2015).
404. See Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 27 at 201.
405. See Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion, supra note 48.
406. Id. at 56-58.
407. Id. at 52-56.
408. Id. at 59-60.
409. Id. at 60-62.
410. The term “financialization” is frequently used in the scholarship to refer to the financial
industry’s growing size, complexity, interconnectedness, number of participants and products,
profit accumulation away from real production, and the constant transformation of real economic variables to tradable financial instruments. See Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of
the American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW 173, 174 (2005); Mike Konczal & Neil Abernathy, Defining Financialization, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (July 27, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/defining-financialization/; Hockett & Omarova, supra note 234 at 1148-1149.
411. See Rana Foroohar, The Economy’s Greatest Illness: The Rise of Unproductive Finance,
EVONOMICS (15 November 2016), http://evonomics.com/financialization-hidden-illness-ranafoorohar/.
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ductivity growth,413 manufacturing outsourcing,414 unsustainable
global debt levels,415 class and political strife,416 decreased entrepreneurship,417 the “collapse” of the middle class,418 “warped” societal
values,419 increased speculative trading and market volatility,420 and
“leeching growth from other sectors” while capturing promising graduates from other industries to pursue otherwise lucrative careers in
finance.421
Financial markets evolve towards greater complexity as the number
of participants, markets, intermediaries, and financial products continues to grow.422 Orthodox economic theory posits that demand for
new financial products emanates from investor demand, and an efficient distribution of risk.423 In 2003, while serving as Federal Reserve
Chairman, Alan Greenspan suggested financial innovation would
“slow” as financial products were efficiently distributed to the most
capable bearers.424 Nearly the opposite has happened in the two de412. See Thomas Philippon, Brief: Finance, Productivity, and Distribution, BROOKINGS INSTIGLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT (October 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/philippon-october-2016.pdf; Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote To RentSeeking? 93 CHI. KENT L. REV. 165, 170 (2018)
413. See CEDRIC DURAND, FICTITIOUS CAPITAL, HOW FINANCE IS APPROPRIATING OUR FUTURE (2014), Owen Woolcock, Is Finance An Unproductive Industry, FINANCIAL TIMES (February 6, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/c8c98627-4992-361b-916f-6a2b4fd4e776.
414. See Gerald F. Davis & Suntae Kim, Financialization of the Economy, 41 ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 203, 216 (2015).
415. See Peter Isackson, The Daily Devil’s Dictionary: Economy Will “Crash”, FAIR OBSERVER (July 5, 2018), https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/jim-rogers-economiccollapse-crash-world-news-this-week/.
416. See Aaron Bobrow-Strain, The Rise and Fall of White Bread, SALON (March 3, 2012),
https://www.salon.com/2012/03/03/the_rise_and_fall_of_white_bread/.
417. See Stacey Higginbotham, Are Crappy Start-ups Wall Street’s Fault? GIGAOM (March 24,
2011), https://gigaom.com/2011/03/24/are-crappy-startups-wall-streets-fault/
418. See Les Leopold, Big Lie: America Doesn’t Have #1 Richest Middle-Class In The
World. . .We’re Ranked 27th, HUFFPOST (June 28, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/les-leopold/big-lie-america-doesnt-ha_b_3516185.html.
419. See Michael Konczal, How The Rise of Finance Has Warped Our Values, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/04/22/howthe-rise-of-finance-has-warped-our-values/?utm_term=.31dc3c6c45e0
420. See COMPLEXITY LABS, Financialization, https://complexitylabs.io/Blog/financializationexplained/.
421. See Bruce Bartlett, ‘Financialization’ as a Cause of Economic Malaise, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (June 11, 2013), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/financialization-as-acause-of-economic-malaise/.
422. See Greenwood & Scharfstein, supra note 165; Michael Collins, Wall Street and The
Financialization Of The Economy, FORBES (February 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
mikecollins/2015/02/04/wall-street-and-the-financialization-of-the-economy/#4f6e026d5783.
423. See Judge, supra note 330 (discussing demand factors that influence financial innovation
including regulatory frameworks).
424. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Corporate Governance (May 8, 2003)
(speech delivered at the Conference on Bank Structure and Competition), available at http://
TUTE
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cades that have since transpired – especially in the post-crisis glut of
secondary market tradable instruments like ETFs.425 A viable
counter-reality is that – given the evolved resilience of MMC - financial markets will never actually “complete.” Market intermediaries
have unceasing incentives to seek profits at all stages of the real economic cycle. This profit-seeking motive stimulates a seemingly endless potential for new financial products and is consistent with
emerging heterodox conception of “supply-side” financial product
innovation.426
Financialization also fosters short term orientation for market intermediaries. The problems of financial market short-termism were lamented as far back as 1940 by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas.427 This problem hasn’t changed – it has gotten worse. The
plague of financial market “short-termism” manifests in agency conflicts between short-term owners shares (traders) and company managers.428 Knowing the stock (and their own compensation via
management option) is susceptible to the wrath of the “street” in failing to meet quarterly projected earnings, managers seek short-term
profits over longer term payouts that would benefit value investors.429
Similar agency problems exist between fund managers and their investors since the former are paid fixed fees based on the value of fund
assets, so they have an incentive to chase short term payoffs or “faddish stocks” with poor long-term fundamentals.430
What should regulators do to mitigate (ideally reverse) the market’s
trend towards financialization-driven destabilization and volatility
without excess paternalism? The range of regulatory responses to the
GameStop saga, for instance, are diverse, complex, and unsettled (and
they invariably requirement more information), but a host of adjustments have been canvassed in the immediate aftermath of the event
www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2003 (“financial innovation will slow as
we approach the world in which financial markets are complete in the sense that all financial
risks can be effectively transferred to those most willing to bear them.”)
425. See ETFGI, supra note 79.
426. See Dan Awrey. Toward a Supply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation, OXFORD LEGAL
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 44/2012 (June 27, 2012), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2094254; see Omarova, supra note 70 at 788.
427. See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, 6-12 (1st ed. 1940).
428. See Gautam Mukunda, The Price of Wall Street’s Power, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
(June 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/06/the-price-of-wall-streets-power; THE ECONOMIST, Double
Trouble (November 12, 2020), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/11/12/doubletrouble.
429. Id.
430. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 427.
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including changes to trading halts,431 increasing capital requirements
on hedge funds, increasing transparency and limiting stock
buybacks,432 consumer protection measures, and imposing disclosure
requirements on social media platforms and forums like Reddit where
sophisticated investors (like hedge funds) can exploit novice investors
with the protection of anonymity.433 Also, prophylactic measure to
reduce instability, if it means restricting the newly armed masses in
their trading access, is politically dangerous and it has been criticized
by both sides of the political aisle as “putting the interests of hedge
funds above small investors.”434
Nevertheless, untethered access to options (by both retail and professional investors) combined with the turbocharge of information
flow through social media, and forums like Reddit, have created modern conditions for bubbles to quickly form.435 Bubbles have always
been a part of market dynamics, yet technology and interconnection
are making it much worse.436 This is why an investigation into misaligned incentives is so important. Another viable measure to reverse
the trend of volatility is to reduce the use of options and leverage in
trading activity altogether (thereby restricting the ability for traders to
“wager much more money on each company that the company is actually worth.”437 Derivatives have consistently exacerbated financial
crises.438 The systemic risk of derivatives increases when collateralization in central clearing becomes impaired because of heighted market
volatility.439
431. See Keller, supra note 311.
432. See Soloman, supra note 218.
433. See Julia Horowitz, Wall Street’s cops weren’t ready for GameStop. They’re paying attention now, CNN (January 29, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/29/investing/gamestop-regulation/index.html.
434. See Soloman, supra note 218.
435. See Horowitz, supra note 432.
436. Id.
437. See Steven Pearlstein, GameStop mania exposes SEC’s failure as regulator, WASHINGTON
POST (January 30, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/30/financial-regulations-wall-street-sec-gamestop/.
438. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. L.
REV. 2 (2011); Mark Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash With A Discussion
of The Federal Reserve Response, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVISIONS OF
RESEARCH AND STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2007-13,
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf; See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988): REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS. NICHOLAS BRADY (CHAIRMAN), U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
439. See Steve Sosnick. Systemic Risks Rears Its Head, TRADERS INSIGHT (January 29, 2021),
https://www.tradersinsight.news/traders-insight/securities/macro/systemic-risk-rears-its-head/.
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Active steps to realign incentives in favor of productive enterprise,
and true capital formation, are warranted. Financial intermediary private gains are tenuously justifiable when they give rise to shared costs.
A system idealized to perform rational capital and risk allocation and
price discovery has given way to extreme speculation, a disproportionately sized financial industry relative to productive output, exacerbated volatility, accelerated dips and spikes, and leverage.440 A
financialized system makes non-financial firms dependent on the
“smooth functioning of the financial sector” for their economic wellbeing, and households dependent on financial assets for their standard
of life and to fund education, health care and other fundamental life
essentials.441 The problem, however, is that market intermediaries
often benefit from volatility,442 and as a result are able to continually
transfer distributive profits in their favor.443 The incentive structure
that exists for market intermediaries is misaligned with the needs of
households and productive industries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Minsky believed that an economic system charactered by MMC led
to increased uncertainty.444 He argued that capitalistic systems should
be subject to state intervention when they generated undesirable results.445 This article has illustrated how Minsky’s MMC paradigm has
evolved since 2008 and argues that modern financial markets are beset
with misaligned incentives which create private gains and shared costs.
The incentive structure that dictates the behaviors of market intermediaries in the modern financial system are detached from the
capital needs of productive firms, and do not foster increased employment or incentivize welfare enhancing innovation. Many products
and activities in modern financial markets have no underlying economic or productive purpose at all. Rather, they produce distributive
gains in favor of financial firms while collaterally increasing their
power, profitability, size, and regulatory and economic influence. The
externalities of a financial system path dependent on increased complexity, volatility, leverage, fragility, hierarchy, and interconnectedness are borne by all, while the benefits of such a system are enjoyed
by very few.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

See Pearlstein, supra note 436.
Tymoigne & Wray, supra note 27 at 78.
See supra, Section III(i).
See supra, Sections III(i) & IV(e).
See Minsky, supra note 1 at 363-364.
Id. at 358.
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Minsky was a believer in John Maynard Keynes’ vision that capitalism should have a “human face.”446 He suggested that the “primary
interest” of a democratic government was “the well-being of its populace,” and as such, regulatory steps were necessary to mitigate the uncertainty and instability caused by MMC.447 This was true decades
ago when Minsky was formulating his theory on MMC, and it remains
particularly true today. Nations around the world are plagued by increased income and wealth inequality,448 and the coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated these trends.449 Regulatory steps are necessary
to reverse the trends of financialization-driven inequality.450 Since
capitalism has evolved, and will continue to evolve, society is not
bound by a particular form,451 or reduced to a false dichotomy of socialism or laissez faire. Minsky advanced that we were “free to
choose” the type of capitalism that we wanted, and that if certain iterations lead to ills like increased uncertainty, income disparity and social inequality then “the market behavior that creates these conditions
should be constrained” at the expense of aggregate income or efficiency.452 He posited that an antidote to the pathological uncertainty
of MMC could include certain “institutional prerequisites,” and he advanced ideas such as investment banking divisions of community development banks to increase the viability of “small and even micro
businesses.”453 He advocated for institutional measures to reduce
446. See Minsky, supra note 1 at 358; see J.M. KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ FAIRE (1972)
447. See Minsky, supra note 1 at 364.
448. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL AND IDEOLOGY (2020); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF
CAPITAL, 8, 19 (2019); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017); Jeanna Smialek, Even as Americans Grew Richer, Inequality Persisted, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(September 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/business/economy/coronavirus-pandemic-income-inequality.html;
449. Ian Goldin & Robert Muggah, COVID-19 is increasing multiple kinds of inequality.
Here’s what we can do about it” WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (October 9, 2020), https://
www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/covid-19-is-increasing-multiple-kinds-of-inequality-here-swhat-we-can-do-about-it/; Gillian Tett, Covid: we’re in the same storm but not the same boat,
FINANCIAL TIMES (September 30, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/8691370f-f0b0-44cf-aa246cfd5d28676e; Sam Jones & Valentina Romei, Pandemic makes world’s billionaires – and their
advisers- richer, FINANCIAL TIMES (October 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ab30d301351b-4387-b212-12fed904324b.
450. Minsky believed that regulatory forbearance in markets exacerbated the potential for
depressions since destabilization emerged from within the system, as a consequence of the profit
seeking actions of financial intermediaries, see Minsky, Stabilizing, supra note 19 at 324. (“a
sophisticated, complex, and dynamic financial system such as ours endogenously generates serious destabilizing force so that serious depressions are natural consequences of noninterventionist capitalism.”)
451. Minsky famously noted that capitalism has “57 varieties” see Wray, supra note 19 at 41.
452. See Minsky, supra note 1 at 364.
453. Id. at 357 & 367.
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poverty, increase access to education and health care, and maintain
full employment.454
The modern financial system is beset with misaligned incentives that
create private gains and shared costs. In support of this contention,
this article has profiled numerous post-crisis financialization trends,
and highlighted diverse case studies, including recent meme stock
bubbles, index construction conflicts, accelerating influences of
fintech, firms that benefit directly from volatility or profit from the
plumbing of an increasingly complex system, recent price dislocations
in credit ETFs, evolved PE business models, misaligned incentives in
SPACs, market disruption from volatility-linked ETPs, fragilities in
pension administration, ESG opacity and investment fund greenwashing, governance conflicts of mega-asset managers, and post credit
trends in debt origination moral hazard and governmental intervention. It advocates for three fundamental policy shifts, which must
each be assessed for their resulting regulatory ramifications, to improve financial markets and make them more aligned with greater societal interests: decrease the power and influence of market
intermediaries; increase the transparency and comparability of investment products; and re-assess the calculus of financialization.

454. Id. at 365 (Minsky also noted that income disparity was even “compatible with a wellfunctioning society provided that “ambience, health care, and education incomes are available
and open to all”).

